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Federal Jurisdiction
in Australian Courts:
Policies and Prospects
Brian R. Opeskidn
I. INTRODUCTION

Like the United States Constitution on which it was modelled, the
Australian Constitution defines a certain class of legal disputes as matters of
federal jurisdiction.

Enumerated in Sections 75 and 76 of the Australian

Constitution, these matters are the subject of "the judicial power of the
Commonwealth" and include amongst other things questions of constitutional
interpretation, questions arising under federal law, and diversity suits.' It is
somewhat curious that the drafters of the Australian Constitution chose to
single out this class of matters for special treatment because the factors that
motivated their disparate treatment in the United States were generally absent
in Australia. At the time of Australia's federation in 1901, each state had a
well-established court system, and there was little reason to fear partiality or
parochialism in the way these courts might dispense justice in matters affecting

* B. Comm Hons. LL.B. New South Wales; B.C.L. Oxon; Senior Lecturer, Faculty of Law,
University of Sydney; Barrister of the Supreme Court of New South Wales. I am indebted to
James Crawford, David Harland, Leslie Katz, Pat Lane, Therese Mac Dermott, Sir Anthony
Mason, Keith Mason, and Ronald McCallum for their comments on an earlier draft of this article.
I also wish to thank Ruth Davis for her generous research assistance, funded by the Law
Foundation of New South Wales.
1. These matters are defined in sections 75 and 76 of the Australian Constitution as follows:
75. In all matters(i.) Arising under any treaty:
(ii.) Affecting consuls or other representatives of other countries:
(iii.) In which the Commonwealth, or a person suing or being sued on behalf of the
Commonwealth, is a party:
(iv.) Between States, or between residents of different States, or between a State and
a resident of another State:
(v.) In which a writ of Mandamus or prohibition or an injunction is sought against
an officer of the Commonwealth: the High Court shall have original jurisdiction.
76. The Parliament may make laws conferring original jurisdiction on the High Court
in any matter(i.) Arising under this Constitution or involving its interpretation:
(ii.) Arising under any laws made by the Parliament:
(iii.) Of Admiralty and maritime jurisdiction:
(iv.) Relating to the same subject-matter claimed under the laws of different States.
AUSTL. CONST. ch. III, §§ 75-76.
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the newly formed Commonwealth. 2 Notwithstanding these differences, the
constitutional drafters followed the American precedent, a decision that
profoundly effected the development of the Australian judicial system.
The Australian Constitution clearly contemplates that federal courts may
adjudicate matters of federal jurisdiction. First, the Constitution itself confers
original jurisdiction on the High Court, which is a federal court, in some
matters of federal jurisdiction. 3 Second, the Constitution grants the Commonwealth Parliament the power to create additional federal courts4 and to define
the jurisdiction of those courts with respect to any matters within federal
jurisdiction.' These powers would have enabled the Parliament to establish
an extensive system of federal courts exercising jurisdiction in all matters of
federal jurisdiction. However, unlike the United States, the Parliament did not
undertake this course in Australia. With the exception of the High Court,
which Parliament established soon after federation, there are only three federal
courts in Australia. In their current incarnation, they are of comparatively
recent origin.6 Far from exercising jurisdiction over the full range of matters
enumerated in sections 75 and 76 of the Constitution, these federal courts have
had jurisdiction conferred on them in a restricted and rather specialized range
of federal matters.
Federal courts were not the only courts that the constitutional drafters
contemplated as exercising federal jurisdiction. In a marked departure from
the template of the United States Constitution, the drafters of the Australian
Constitution expressly allowed Parliament to invest any state court with federal
jurisdiction. 7 This power, which has strikingly but inaccurately been called
the "autochthonous expedient,"' was thought to be a sensible alternative to the
2. See JOHN QUICK & ROBERT R. GARRAN, ANNOTATED CONSTITUTION OF THE
AUSTRALIAN COMMONWEALTH 804 (photo. reprint 1976) (1901); ZELMAN COWEN & LESLIE
ZINES, FEDERAL JURISDICTION INAUSTRALIA Xv-vi, 175 (2d ed. 1978).
3. The Constitution confers jurisdiction on the High Court in § 75 matters, and Parliament
may confer additionaljurisdiction on the High Court in § 76 matters. AUSTL. CONST. §§ 75-76.
4. Id. § 71.
5. Id. § 77(i).
6. The federal courts are the Family Court of Australia established in 1975, the Federal Court
of Australia Court] established in 1976 and the Industrial Relations Court of Australia established
in 1994. The Federal Bankruptcy Court established in 1928 previously exercised the bankruptcy
jurisdiction which is currently exercised by the Federal Court. The labor law jurisdiction of the
Industrial Relations Court was previously exercised by the Federal Court, and before that by the
Commonwealth Industrial Court. The latter was established in 1956 and renamed the Australian
Industrial Court in 1973.
7. AUSTL. CONST. § 77(iii).
8. The Queen v. Kirby, Exparte Boilermakers' Society of Australia, 94 C.L.R. 254, 268
(1956). The exercise of federal jurisdiction by state courts is not unique to Australia. In the
United States, state courts are assumed to have concurrent jurisdiction in the adjudication and
enforcement of federal law unless jurisdiction is expressly or impliedly made exclusive to the
federal courts. Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502 (1962); Claflin v. Houseman,
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financial and administrative costs of establishing a separate system of federal
courts to adjudicate the new class of federal matters established by the
Constitution. The federal legislature exercised this power in 1903 and
conferred jurisdiction on "the several Courts of the States" in virtually all
matters of federal jurisdiction. 9 Even today state courts deal with a significant
proportion of federal matters in both civil and criminal cases.
The provision in the Australian Constitution authorizing the exercise of
federal jurisdiction by either federal or state courts, as Parliament might
choose, gives rise to the central questions addressed in this paper. In Australia
the relationship between state and federal courts has often been a sensitive one.
In part this sensitive relationship is due to differences in the terms and
conditions of judicial office but is also due to differences in the nature of the
day-to-day work of those courts. Rightly or wrongly, there is a perception
that the trial work of some federal courts is more varied and stimulating than
that of the state courts. Because the nature of the work undertaken by state
and federal courts is in part a function of the distribution of federal jurisdiction
between them, judges often have been concerned with the way in which
Parliament exercises its power to confer federal jurisdiction on state and
federal courts. In particular, state court judges have frequently expressed
concern about the erosion of the jurisdiction and status of state courts at the
hands of the federal legislature.'0
The potential for the Commonwealth Parliament to affect thejurisdictional
balance between federal and state courts has grown tremendously in recent
years. The reason for this is that, although the heads of federal jurisdiction
are fixed by the terms of the Constitution, the range of matters falling within
those heads has continued to expand. One such head of federal jurisdiction is
section 76(ii) which makes any matter arising under federal law a matter of
federal jurisdiction." In Australia, the role of the federal legislature in
regulating commercial and private life has steadily increased throughout this
century. In the United States, the expansive interpretation of the Commerce
Clause has shifted the balance of legislative power toward central government.
As in the United States, Australian courts have interpreted the various heads
of federal legislative power in a manner that has permitted an ever-expanding
role for federal legislative action."2 Earlier this century, state law principally
93 U.S. 130 (1876); Martin H. Redish & John E. Muench, Adjudication of Federal Causesof
Action in State Court, 75 MICH. L. REv. 311 (1977).
9. Judiciary Act of 1903, pt. VI § 39(2). Only a narrow class of matters was preserved for
the exclusive jurisdictionof the High Court, the only federal court then in existence. See id. § 38.
10. Sir Walter Campbell, The Relationshipbetween the FederalCourtand the Supreme Courts
of the States, 11 U. QUEENSL. L.J. 3 (1979); A.J. Rogers, State FederalCourt Relations, 55
AUSTL. L.J. 630 (1981). See Sir Laurence Street, The Consequences of a Dual System of State
and Federal Courts, 52 AuSTL. L.J. 434 (1978).
11. AUSTL. CONST. § 76(ii).
12. Section 51 of the Australian Constitution grants federal legislativepower over thirty-nine
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governed areas such as corporations, business conduct, bankruptcy, and
family relations, but today complex federal statutes govern these areas. 3
The rise of federal legislation has had a corresponding effect both on the
scope of federal jurisdiction and on the ability of the federal legislature to
determine the distribution of jurisdiction between state and federal courts
regarding matters of federal jurisdiction. Of course, the expansion of federal
jurisdiction need not necessarily be reflected in an enhanced role for federal
courts because new areas of federal jurisdiction may be invested exclusively
in state courts. Nevertheless, the potential shift in the balance between state
and federal courts has heightened the importance of Parliament's role in
achieving an appropriate equilibrium between the state and federal spheres of
the judicial branch of government.
Against this background, this paper examines the principles and policies
that underlie the federal government's allocation of federal jurisdiction between
the state or federal court systems. Examined in Part II, the first issue is why
Parliament confers jurisdiction on federal courts at all, when Parliament can
invest state courts with federal jurisdiction. If Parliament confers jurisdiction
on federal courts, a second question arises, namely, whether that federal
jurisdiction should be exclusive or concurrent with state court jurisdiction.
Examined in Part III, the second issue arises because the Constitution grants
Parliament the power to define the extent to which the jurisdiction of any
federal court is exclusive of that which belongs to or is invested in state
courts.' 4 Part IV examines three important developments which have affected
the relationship between the jurisdiction of state and federal courts: (1) the
development of the doctrine of accrued federal jurisdiction; (2) the referral of
legislative power from the states to the Commonwealth; and, most significantly, (3) the nationwide scheme for cross-vesting the jurisdiction of superior
courts. This Paper's principal focus will be on federal-state court issues that
have arisen since the establishment of the new federal courts in the mid-1 970s.
Examples will be drawn from various fields of federal law, such as trade
practices, intellectual property, family law, bankruptcy and admiralty.'"

enumerated subject matters. AUSTL. CONST. § 51. On the expansion of federal power, see
generally Sir Anthony Mason, The Role of a ConstitutionalCourtin a Federation:A Comparison
of the Australian and the United States Experience, 16 FED. L. REV. 1, 15-16 (1986).
13. See, e.g., Bankruptcy Act of 1966; Trade Practices Act of 1974; Family Law Act of
1975; Corporations Act of 1989. The federal corporations statute is a model law enacted only
for the Australian Capital Territory, but each of the states and the Northern Territory have given
it the force of law by implementing legislation.
14. AUSTL. CONST. § 77(ii).
15. For a review of the policies behind the conferral of jurisdiction in respect of judicial
review of federal administrative actions, see Clifton Baker, State Courts and FederalAdIninistrativeLaw: Problems of FederalJurisdiction, 17 FED. L. REV. 45 (1987); L.J.W. Aitken, State
Courts and the Administrative Decisions (JudicialReview) Act 7 U.N.S.W.L.J. 254 (1984).
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II. WHY CONFER FEDERAL JURISDICTION ON FEDERAL COURTS?
Under the Australian Constitution, the federal Parliament has a fundamental role in defining the federal jurisdiction of federal and state courts. This
power extends to the regulation of both original and appellate jurisdiction, and
is limited only by constitutional provisions specifying a minimum role for the
High Court as the country's supreme judicial tribunal.16 In particular, federal
legislative power extends to the following matters: (a) conferring original
jurisdiction on the High Court in section 76 matters (jurisdiction in section 75
matters is assured by the Constitution itself); (b) defining the original
jurisdiction of federal courts, other than the High Court, in section 75 and
section 76 matters; (c) investing state courts with jurisdiction in section 75 and
section 76 matters; (d) defining the extent to which the jurisdiction of any
federal court is exclusive of that of the state courts; (e) prescribing exceptions
and regulations to the appellate jurisdiction of the High Court; and (f) defining
the appellate jurisdiction of federal courts other than the High Court. 17
In light of these legislative powers, the principle question considered in
this Part is why Parliament might choose to confer federal jurisdiction on
federal courts rather than invest such jurisdiction in state courts. Not everyone
has accepted the need to confer jurisdiction on federal courts. Writing shortly
before the birth of the Commonwealth of Australia, two noted commentators
on the Constitution predicted that:
it is probable that for some time there will be no necessity for the creation
of any inferior federal courts, but that all the cases in which the original
jurisdiction of the Commonwealth is invoked can be dealt with either by
the High Court itself or by Courts of the States."8
More recently the former Chief Justice of Australia, Sir Harry Gibbs,
remarking about the rise of the Federal Court wrote, "[ilt is difficult to
discover any valid reason in principle, or any practical necessity, for bringing
into existence the new Federal Court and conferring upon it its present
jurisdiction."" 9 In his Honor's opinion, it would have been better to pass this
jurisdiction over to state courts.

16. Sections 73 and 75 of the Constitution confer original and appellate jurisdiction on the
High Court in certain defined matters.
17. The power in section 77(i) to make laws "[d]efining the jurisdiction of any federal court
other than the High Court" includes power to define both the appellate and the original
jurisdiction of those courts. AUSTL. CONST., § 77(i); see Alh Yick v. Lehmert, 2 C.L.R. 593,
603-04 (1905); COWEN & ZINEs, supra note 2, at 130-38.
18. QUICK & GARRAN, supra note 2, at 726.
19. Sir Harry Gibbs, The State of theAustralianJudicature,55 AUSTL. L. J. 677,677 (1981);
see also infra part II.D.
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The federal Parliament has not adopted the minimalist role for federal
courts envisaged by Sir Harry Gibbs, nor has it conferred jurisdiction in all
federal matters on federal courts. The issue of the appropriate balance
between federal and state court jurisdiction was widely ventilated in the 1960s
and 1970s in relation to numerous proposals for the creation of a superior
federal court. In essence the debate centered around whether the new court
should be a large court with jurisdiction over all matters of federal jurisdiction
as in the United States, or a small court with a more selective jurisdictional
basis.2" Ultimately, the small court model was chosen. This pattern is
evident today in all federal courts created by Parliament. The Family Court
and the Industrial Relations Court exercise jurisdiction in the specific fields of
family law and labor law, respectively. Notwithstanding its jurisdiction is
conferred on it by more than a hundred acts of Parliament, 2' the Federal
Court exercises jurisdiction in only eight principal areas of federal law, namely
trade practices, consumer protection, intellectual property, taxation, administrative review, corporations, admiralty, and bankruptcy.
What principles and policies have motivated Parliament to confer
jurisdiction on federal courts? Until the 1970s, Parliament did not proceed on
any set principles, and relevant federal legislation reflected ad hoc decisions
made without any real thought being given to the problem.22 However, when
legislation establishing the Federal Court was introduced into the House of
Representatives in 1976, the Attorney General, Mr. Ellicott, attempted to
answer this question by stating that "[t]he government believes that only where
there are special policy or perhaps historical reasons for doing so should
original federal jurisdiction be vested in a federal court." 23 The Attorney
General went on to name industrial law, bankruptcy, trade practices, and
judicial review of federal administrative action as appropriate subject areas for
the jurisdiction of a federal court. The Attorney General did not explain the
special policy or historical reasons behind the choice of areas. 24 Others who
have held that office have expressed similar views though they often restated
rather than elucidated the basis for conferring jurisdiction on federal courts.'
In view of these general statements, it is appropriate to examine in greater

20. Peter Durack, The Special Role of the FederalCourt ofAustralia, 55 AUSTL. L. J. 778,
779 (1981).
21. FED. CT. OF AUSTL., ANN. REP. 1992-1993, App. 1, at 96-98.
22. M.H. Byers & P.B. Toose, The Necessity for a New Federal Court: A Survey of the
Federal Court System in Australia, 36 AUsrL. L. J. 308, 309 (1963).
23. C. OF AuSTL., P. DEBATES, H. of R., 2111 (Oct. 21, 1976).
24. Id.
25. See C. OF AUSTL., P. DEBATES, S. 1060 (Sept. 28, 1978) (Sen. Durack); Sir Garfield
Barwick, The AustralianJudicialSystem: The ProposedNew FederalSuperiorCourt, 1 FED. L.
REV. 1, 3 (1964); Sir Nigel Bowen, Federaland State CourtRelationships,53 AuSTL. L. 3. 806,
807-08 (1979).
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detail the historical reasons or special policies that underlie and inform the
conferral of original and appellate jurisdiction on federal courts.
A. High Court's Special Role
Whatever the policies underlying the conferral of jurisdiction on other
federal courts, clearly the High Court of Australia is in a special position.
The Constitution itself envisaged a federal supreme court under the name of
the High Court of Australia,26 and conferred on it certain original and
appellate jurisdiction.27 The constitutional provisions relating to the High
Court's original jurisdiction are clearly modelled on Article III of the United
States Constitution, but the provisions relating to the Court's appellate
jurisdiction differ fundamentally from analogous provisions in the United
States Constitution. The High Court of Australia operates as a general court
of appeal from the state supreme courts in both federal and non-federal
matters, and thus the Court has an important unifying effect on the common
law throughout Australia."
The role of Parliament in relation to the High Court generally has been
limited to conferring jurisdiction on the High Court in section 76 matters and
prescribing exceptions and regulations in respect of its appellate jurisdiction
in accordance with section 73. In earlier times, the High Court bore a
considerable burden of original and appellate jurisdiction under an assortment
of federal statutes. In the view of some judges, much of this work impeded
the central role of the Court as interpreter of the Constitution and the final
court of general appeal.29 Since 1976, however, Parliament has done much
to reform the High Court's jurisdiction and to relieve the Court of its
excessive workload.3" The Attorney General, Mr. Ellicott, stated the guiding
light for these reforms when introducing the first of these changes:
The High Court occupies a position of special importance under our
constitutional framework. Not only is it the final interpreter of the
Constitution, but it has a significant role as the court of appeal from State
supreme courts and other federal courts. In this role, it has achieved

26. The High Court was formally established by Part II of the Judiciary Act of 1903. See Part
II of the High Court of Australia Act 1979.

27. AUSTL. CONST. §§ 73, 75.
28. In this respect the High Court is similar to the Supreme Court of Canada which acts as
a general court of appeal from the Canadian provinces. CAN. CONST. pt. VII, § 101.
29. See Sir Garfield Barwick, Address to the National Press Club (June 10, 1976), in 50
AUSTL. L. J. 433 (1976).
30. See generally, JAMES CRAWFORD, AUSTRALIAN COURTS OF LAW 189-91 (3d ed. 1993);
Sir Garfield Barwick, Address to the Australian Legal Convention (July 8, 1977), The State of
the AustralianJudicature,51 AuSTL. L. J. 480, 488-90 (1977).
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recognition throughout the common law world as one of the great common
law courts. It is vital to the working of the High Court that it should be
left free to concentrate on constitutional issues and on the fundamental
issues of law that come before it in the exercise of its appellate jurisdic-

tion.

31

Because of these reforms, the High Court now has a more circumscribed
original and appellate jurisdiction within the limits set by the Constitution
itself. Parliament has conferred original jurisdiction on the Court in matters
arising under the Constitution or involving its interpretation, within the
meaning of section 76(i), as befits its role as Australia's supreme judicial tribunal.32 It has also conferred jurisdiction on the High Court in a few selected
matters arising under federal law, within the meaning of section 76(ii). 33 But
apart from these matters, jurisdiction is not otherwise vested in the Court in
section 76 matters.34 Likewise, the Court's appellate jurisdiction has been
greatly restricted in recent years by the requirement that an appellant in nearly
all cases obtain special leave to appeal. 35 The statutory grounds on which
special leave may be granted reinforce the Court's role as the apex of the
judicial hierarchy in Australia. A party may generally obtain special leave only
if case raises a question of law of public importance, requires the resolution
of differences of opinion between different courts, or is otherwise in the
interests of justice.3"
Clearly, the decisions to vest original jurisdiction in the High Court and
to prescribe conditions on the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, have been
influenced by considerations differing from those relevant to the conferral of

31. C. OF AUSTL., P. DEBATES, H. OF R., 2944 (June 3, 1976).

32. Judiciary Act of 1903, § 30(a).
33. Sitting as the Court of Disputed Returns, the High Court has original jurisdiction
regarding federal electoral law, Commonwealth Electoral Act of 1918, Referendum (Constitution
Alteration) Act of 1906. The Court also has original jurisdiction in "trials of indictable offences"
against federal law, Judiciary Act of 1903 § 30(c).
34. As to the High Court's admiralty and maritime jurisdiction under section 76(iii), see
AUSTL. L. REFORM COMM'N, Civ. ADMIRALTY JURISDICTION, REP. 33 (1986). As to the
Court's jurisdiction under section 76(iv), see Leslie Katz, The History of the Inclusion in the
Commonwealth Constitution of Section 76(iv), 2 PUB. L. REV. 228 (1991).
35. Special leave is not required in an appeal from a single justice of the High Court
(Judiciary Act 1903 § 34), or in an appeal from the Full Court of the Family Court where that
Court gives a certificate stating that an important question of law or public interest is involved
(Family Law Act 1975 § 95).
36. Judiciary Act of 1903 § 35A. The requirement that an appellant obtain special leave to
appeal to the High Court has been held to conform with section 73 of the Constitution, which
provides a right of appeal from a state supreme court to the High Court. The special leaves
requirement conforms to section 73 because that right is subject to exceptions and regulations
prescribed by Parliament. See Smith Kline & French Lab. (Austl.) Ltd. v. Commonwealth, 173
C.L.R. 194 (1991).
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jurisdiction on other federal courts. Central amongst these has been the need
to preserve the High Court as the "keystone of the federal arch.""7
B. Uniformity
A second factor to have exerted a powerful influence on the distribution
of federal jurisdiction between state and federal courts is the desire for
uniformity. In essence the argument is that a federal court with national
operation can attain uniformity in the interpretation and development of federal
law which state courts interpreting the same laws cannot achieve. In relation
to the United States Constitution, Alexander Hamilton expressed the matter
with great clarity in the following terms:
If there are such things as political axioms, the propriety of the judicial
power of a government being coextensive with its legislative, may be
ranked among the number. The mere necessity of uniformity in the interpretation of the national laws, decides the question. Thirteen independent
courts of final jurisdiction over the same causes, arising upon the same
laws, is a hydra in government, from which nothing but contradiction and
confusion can proceed. 8
Similarly, another American commentator stated that "it hardly seems
open to doubt that a full system of independent federal courts plays a valuable
part in furthering the39rapid, widespread, yet uniform and accurate, interpretation of federal law.
In Australia, this argument has been most forcefully put in relation to
jurisdiction in trade practices matters. Australia has had legislation dealing
with restrictive trade practices almost since the time of federation.4
Although many of the earlier acts were considered ineffectual because of
narrow coverage, high cost, and cumbersome procedures, the enactment of the
Trade Practices Act of 19744' heralded a new era in the regulation of
business conduct in the marketplace. Broadly speaking, the Act deals with two
types of issues: Part IV addresses restrictive trade practices matters, 4' and

37. Alfred Deakin, Australia's first Attorney-General,described the Court in these terms when
sponsoring legislation to establish it. See C. OF AUSTL., P. DEBATES, H. R., 10967 (Mar. 18,
1902). J.M. BENNETT, KEYSTONE OF THE FEDERAL ARCH 12-20 (1980).
38. THE FEDERALIST No. 80, at 364-65 (Alexander Hamilton) (Hallowell, Glazier, Musters,
Smith eds., 1842).
39. Paul J.Mishkin, The Federal"Question" in the DistrictCourts, 53 COLUM. L. REV. 157,
171 (1953).
40. See, e.g., Australian Industries Preservation Act of 1906, Trade Practices Act of 1965,
Restrictive Trade Practices Act of 1971.
41. Trade Practices Act of 1974.
42. Id. §§ 45-51 (dealing with arrangements substantially lessening competition, misuses of
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Part V concerns consumer protection measures.4 3 In deciding which courts
should exercise this new jurisdiction, the federal Parliament clearly could have
allowed state courts to exercise the jurisdiction, or conferred that jurisdiction
on a federal court. In addition, Parliament had power to determine whether
that jurisdiction was to be exclusive or concurrent. In the result, Parliament
conferred exclusive jurisdiction on the Australian Industrial Court" to hear
and determine any action, prosecution, or other proceeding under the Act.45
That jurisdiction was later transferred to the Federal Court upon its establish-

ment.

46

The Minister for Manufacturing Industry, Mr. Enderby, explained the
choice of a federal court when introducing the legislation into the House of
Representatives. He remarked that confining jurisdiction initially to the
Australian Industrial Court would "assist the early development of a cohesive
body of case law which might not be possible if, in the early stages of the
operation of the legislation, courts of lower status-presided over by
magistrates, for example-were to have jurisdiction." 47 In a similar vein, Sir
Nigel Bowen once stated that the conferral of trade practices jurisdiction on
a federal court was especially important because, in a new field of law, cases
would frequently raise new issues for determination. In his view, to have one
court dealing with these matters would produce a more consistent body of
legal doctrine.48
It is apparent from these passages that the development of a uniform and
cohesive body of jurisprudence in a new area of federal law was an important

market power, price discrimination, and mergers and acquisitions).
43. Id. §§ 51A-75A. Part V prohibits misleading or deceptive conduct, bait advertising, and
pyramid selling. It also implies certain conditions and warranties into contracts for the sale of
goods or services.
44. Trade Practices Act of 1974 § 169.
45. However, state courts had jurisdiction over one important consumer protection matter.
Part V, Division 2 of the Trade Practices Act of 1974 implies into all consumer contracts certain
non-excludableconditions and warranties. Trade Practices Act of 1974, §§ 66-74. Where there
is a breach of these conditions and warranties, the proper action for the consumer to institute is
an action for breach of contract rather than one for breach of the Trade Practices Act itself. State
courts have jurisdiction over such common law claims and prior to 1987, that jurisdiction was
exclusive of that of the Federal Court. See Arturi v. Zupps Motors Pty. Ltd., 33 A.L.R. 243
(1980); Zalai v. Col. Crawford (Retail) Pty. Ltd., 2 N.S.W.L.R. 438 (1980).
46. See Schedule, Federal Court of Australia (Consequential Provisions) Act of 1976, § 3.
Concurrent jurisdiction has now been conferred on state courts over consumer protection matters
under Part V of the Trade Practices Act. See Jurisdiction of Courts (MiscellaneousAmendments)
Act of 1987.
47. C. OF AusTL., P. DEBATES, H. oF R., 234 (July 16, 1974).
48. Sir Nigel Bowen, The Anatomy of a FederalCourt, 1 AUSrL. B. R V. 190, 195 (1985);
see also Metroplaza Pry. Ltd. v. Girvan NSW Pty. Ltd. (in liq.), 24 N.S.W.L.R. 718, 721
(1991); Rogers, supra note 10, at 640; Andrew Rogers, FederalState Courts-The need to
restructureto avoidjurisdictionalconflicts, 54 AUSTL. L. J. 285, 288 (1980).
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role for the Industrial Court. Undoubtedly uniformity in the interpretation of
federal laws and other matters of federal jurisdiction is desirable.49 However, it is by no means obvious that the only satisfactory way to achieve this goal
is by conferring original jurisdiction on a federal court.
One reason for this is the role of precedent and judicial comity in
achieving uniformity of interpretation. Consider, for example, a situation in
which state courts are invested with federal jurisdiction over a matter arising
under federal law. Although the courts of one state are not bound by a
decision of another state court that interprets federal law, undoubtedly great
weight will be accorded to a decision of another state court. This situation
arose in R. v. Parsons0 where the Full Court of the Victorian Supreme Court
had to consider the weight to be attached to a decision of the Queensland
Court of Criminal Appeal on the interpretation of the federal Customs Act
1901.51 Notwithstanding their misgivings about the correctness of the
Queensland decision, a majority of the Victorian Court followed the Queensland interpretation in holding that the federal offense of importing prohibited
drugs did not require proof of mens rea. 2 The majority went on to approve
the words of Chief Justice Street of the New South Wales Supreme Court, in
a like case, in which his Honor stated:
Despite the forebodings of the prophets of doom to the effect that the
existing State court system is less than appropriate to furnish the forum for
construing Commonwealth legislation, the suggestion being that inconsistent views between the States will lead to inconsistencies in the administration of the law, I have no difficulty whatever in perceiving that the
doctrine of precedent is fully adequate to cope with these risks. As a
matter of precedent this Court is not, of course, bound by the decision of
the Full Court of Victoria. But I have not the slightest doubt that, where
a Commonwealth statute has been construed by the ultimate appellate court
within any State or Territory, that construction should, as a matter of
ordinary practice, be accepted and applied by the courts of other States and
Territories so long as it is permitted to stand unchanged either by the court

49. Some have argued, however, that there are advantages in varying approaches to complex
legal problems and that a variety of informed opinion may assist in the evolution and adaptation
of legal rules. See Campbell, supra note 10, at 11. On the other hand, different but co-existing
state interpretations of federal law make individual rights and obligations vary with the forum and
may compromise the objectives of the rule of law. See Brian R. Opeskin, The Price of Forum
Shopping:A Reply to ProfessorJuenger, 16 SYD. L. REv. 14, 15-17 (1994).
50. [1983] 2 V.R. 499.
51. R. v. Gardiner, 27 A.L.R. 140 (1979).
52. Justice Starke, dissenting, acknowledged the Queensland decision to be a highly persuasive
authority. However, his Honor stated that where a court is convinced that the decision of another
state court is erroneous and likely to cause serious injustice, the court is entitled to decide the
matter for itself. Parsons,at 508 (Starke, J., dissenting).
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of origin or by the High Court. The risk of differing interpretations
amongst the States is thus negated and, in practical terms, a uniform
application of Commonwealth laws throughout Australia is assured.5 3
When one compares the principle of comity operating between state courts
of coordinate authority, it is apparent that if the relevant jurisdiction were to
be conferred instead on a federal court, judges of that court would be in no
different position vis-a-vis each other. A single judge of a federal court is not
bound to follow a decision of another judge of the same court, although clearly
great deference would be given to an earlier decision. From the viewpoint of
achieving uniformity, there would thus seem to be little basis for preferring
federal courts over state courts in the exercise of original federal jurisdiction.
A second reason for caution in accepting the argument of uniformity as
a ground for conferring jurisdiction on federal courts arises from the role of
appeals. In 1979 Sir Walter Campbell, later Chief Justice of Queensland,
argued that it is the function of the High Court to ensure uniformity in the law
and that the appellate jurisdiction of the High Court has ensured, and will
continue to ensure, the uniformity of judge-made law in Australia in
appropriate circumstances."
His Honor thus saw no reason based on
uniformity for creating the new Federal Court or for conferring extensive
jurisdiction on it. Since then the Judiciary Act of 1903 has been amended to
require the High Court to consider whether a decision of the Court is
necessary to resolve differences of opinion between different courts when
granting special leave to appeal.5" This emphasizes the role of the High
Court as a court of general appeal at the apex of the court hierarchy in
pronouncing the law for the whole of Australia, and thus distinguishes
56
Australia from the United States, as earlier described by Hamilton.
The federal Parliament has from time to time recognized the importance
of appellate jurisdiction in achieving a uniform interpretation of federal law.

53. [1981] R. v. Abbrederis, 1 N.S.W.L.R. 530, 542. There would appear to be a similar
relationship between decisions of state and federal courts in situations of concurrentjurisdiction.
In R. v. Yates, 102 A.L.R. 673, 679-80 (1991), the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
followed a decision of the full Federal Court on the interpretation of a provision of the federal
Crimes Act of 1914. Notwithstanding the New South Wales Court's misgivings about the earlier
decision, it was not convinced that the decision was "plainly wrong," and to reconsider the point
would merely "highlight further the evils of waste and delay that the present distribution amongst
courts in Australia of the power to exercise federal jurisdiction occasionally causes." The High
Court refused special leave to appeal stating that intermediate appellate courts should generally
accept and apply the decisions of courts of coordinate authority on the interpretation of Commonwealth.law. 13 No. 16 LEG. REP. C3 (1992). See also Australian Sec. Comm'n v. Marlborough
Gold Mines Ltd., 177 C.L.R. 485, 492 (1993).
54. Campbell, supra note 10, at 10-11.
55. Judiciary Act of 1903, § 35A, inserted by Judiciary Amendment Act (No. 2) of 1984.
56. Supra note 38 and accompanying text.
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Uniformity may be achieved not only by conferring original jurisdiction on
federal courts, but also by giving federal courts exclusive jurisdiction to hear
appeals from decisions of state courts in matters of federal jurisdiction. This
approach was adopted during the 1980s with respect to intellectual property
matters, which serves as a useful example of the way in which jurisdiction has
been shared between state and federal courts in the Australian federation."
The law relating to intellectual property in Australia is governed principally
by federal legislation enacted pursuant to Parliament's power to make laws
with respect to "Copyrights, patents of inventions and designs, and trade
marks"58 and by relevant principles of common law and equity. Prior to
1976, much of the jurisdiction under relevant federal intellectual property
legislation was conferred on the High Court in its original jurisdiction. In
1976 jurisdiction in relation to trade marks, patents, and designs was expressly
conferred on the supreme court of each state and territory,59 and the High
Court's jurisdiction was abolished. The consequence of these changes was that
no federal court could exercise original jurisdiction over intellectual property
matters, unless such matters were associated with matters otherwise within the
court's jurisdiction.' °
Although most proceedings under the federal intellectual property laws
were brought within the state court systems, an attempt was made to preserve
uniformity in the interpretation of these laws through the provisions relating
to appeals. The legislation provided that appeals under the various Acts could
be taken to the federal court, or to the High Court with leave, but that
otherwise no other appeals could be instituted. 6' These provisions ensured
that state appeals courts could not act as the final arbiters of the meaning of
the federal legislation and that all appeals were determined in a federal court.
With some simplification, the situation was thus that substantive first instance

57. See generally, JILL

McKEOUGH & ANDREW STEWART, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN

AUSTRALIA 38-40 (1991); STANIFORTH RICKETSON, THE LAW OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 3546 (1984); D.R. SHANAHAN, AUSTRALIAN LAW OF TRADE MARKS AND PASSING OFF 483-94

(2d ed. 1990). A similar approach was taken in relation to the bankruptcy jurisdiction exercised
by state courts and jurisdiction in federal taxation matters. See C. OF AUSTL., P. DEB., H.R.,
2111 (Oct. 21, 1976); id. at 2283 (Nov. 3, 1976).
58. AUSrL. CONST. § 51(xviii).
59. These were defined to be "prescribed courts" under the relevant Acts. See Trade Marks
Act of 1955, §§ 6, 112(1B); Patents Act of 1952, §§ 6, 146(1B); Schedule, Patents Act of 1990,
§ 155; Designs Act of 1906 §§ 4(1), 40G(1B). In relation to copyright, the same result was
probably achieved by the general conferral of federal jurisdiction upon state courts by section 39(2) of the Judiciary Act of 1903. But cf. P.H. LANE, LANE'S COMMENTARY ON THE
AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION 458-59 (1986).
60. See infra part IV.A.
61. Trade Marks Act of 1955, § 114; Patents Act of 1952, § 148; Patents Act of 1990,
§ 158; Designs Act of 1906, § 401; Copyright Act of 1968, §§ 131B, 248L.
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decisions in intellectual property cases were made exclusively in state courts
and appeals were determined exclusively in federal courts.
These provisions were amended in 1987 to confer concurrent original
jurisdiction on the federal court to hear and determine matters arising under
the federal intellectual property Acts,6 2 but the provisions relating to the
exclusive appellate jurisdiction of federal courts have remained unchanged.
In the present context, the jurisdictional arrangements regarding intellectual
property matters demonstrate that uniformity in the interpretation of federal
law can be achieved by conferring appellate jurisdiction on federal courts,
notwithstanding that original jurisdiction in those matters is exercised by the
state courts.
C. Specialty
A compelling argument for conferring federal jurisdiction on federal
courts is that it enables judges to develop specialist expertise regarding the
particular subject areas entrusted to them. This factor has been an important
determinant of the Australian federal judicial system where all federal courts
established by Parliament, other than the High Court, have been specialized
tribunals. In this respect the United States model of a full and separate system
of federal courts has never been followed.
The specialization of Australian federal courts is readily apparent in
relation to the Family Court, which exercises jurisdiction in matrimonial
causes, and in relation to the new Industrial Relations Court, which exercises
jurisdiction in labor law.63 The Federal Court also has specialized functions,
although they are not as immediately apparent because jurisdiction is conferred64
on the Court by more than one hundred Acts of the federal Parliament.
Indeed, Sir Nigel Bowen once reflected that he had misgivings about accepting
his appointment as the first Chief Justice of the Federal Court because it
looked as if the Court would have a "rag-bag" of jurisdiction.65 Notwith-

62. Jurisdiction of Courts (MiscellaneousAmendments) Act of 1987, AUSTL. ACTS P. (1987)
amending § 112(1) Trade Marks Act of 1955, AUSTL. AcTs (1975); § 146(1) Patents Act of
1952, AUSTL. AcTs (1975); § 154 Patents Act of 1990, AUSTL. AcTs (1990); § 40G(1) Designs
Act of 1906, AUSTL. AcTs (1975); §§ 131C, 248M Copyright Act of 1968, AUsTL. AcTs
(1975). This change was heralded by the report of a governmental committee which
recommended that jurisdiction in matters of patent law be transferred to the federal court exclusively. See INDUSTRIAL PROP. ADVISORY COMM., REP. ON PAT., INNOVATION AND
COMPETITION IN AuSTL. 68-70 (1984).
63. The establishment of a new industrial relations court followed the 1985 recommendations
of the "Hancock Committee." See COMM. OF REv. INTO AUSTL. INDUS. REL. LAW AND SYS.,
REP., vol. 2, at 380-98 (1985); J.T. Ludeke, The StructuralFeatures of the New System, 7
AUSTL. J. LAB. L. 132, 141-42 (1994).
64. FED. CT. OF AUSTL., supra note 21, at 96-98.
65. Bowen, supra note 48, at 190.
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standing the melange of sources, the vast majority of the Court's original
jurisdiction concerns only eight areas of federal law: trade practices, consumer
protection, intellectual property, taxation, administrative review, corporations,
admiralty, and bankruptcy.
Whatever the area of federal law in question, the argument of specialization is premised on the notion that, if jurisdiction were conferred instead on
state courts, the judges of those courts would have insufficient contact with the
subject matter of the proceedings to deal with the matter properly and
expeditiously. This point has been made, for example, in relation to federal
administrative law.66 Since the earliest years of federation, review of the
actions of Commonwealth officers has been removed for the most part from
the jurisdiction of state courts. 7 This has enabled federal courts (first the
High Court and now the Federal Court) to develop a knowledge and
understanding of Commonwealth governmental processes. This may not have
been possible in state courts because the judges would have had only
occasional contact with these matters. It has also been argued in some areas
of federal law, such as patents, that the detailed and technical nature of the
evidence and case law may make it appropriate for jurisdiction to be exercised
by a specialized federal tribunal rather than by a state court of general
jurisdiction.68
Reinforcing the specialization and expertise of federal judges in certain
areas of federal law is the fact that many judges hold commissions on related
tribunals and bodies. Several judges of the Federal Court hold commissions
on the Administrative Appeals Tribunal, the Trade Practices Tribunal, and the
Copyright Tribunal, as well as holding appointments to bodies such as the
Copyright Law Review Committee and the Admiralty Rules Committee.69
In some instances the legislation establishing a tribunal actually requires one
or more of its members to be a judge of a federal court. 70 Two important
features of these tribunals are that they are nonjudicial in character and that
judges appointed to them are appointed in a personal capacity, in accordance
with the persona designata doctrine. 71 Clearly judges who exercise non66. Id. 194; Durack, supra note 20, at 779.
67. Judiciary Act of 1903 § 38(e) confers exclusive jurisdiction on the High Court in "matters
in which a writ of mandamus or prohibition is sought against an officer of the Commonwealth
or a federal Court." Other prerogative writs, such as habeas corpus, may be available in state
courts.
68. INDUSTRIAL PROP. ADVISORY COMM., supranote 62, at 68-70; Sir Garfield Barwick, The
State of the AustralianJudicature,53 AUSTL. L. J. 487, 489 (1979).
69. FED. CT. OF AUSTL., supra note 21, at 3-4.
70. Trade Practices Act of 1974 § 31 (Stating the requirements for appointment of presidential
members of the Trade Practices Tribunal); Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act of 1975 § 7,
(stating the requirements for appointment of the President of the Administrative Appeals
Tribunal); Copyright Act of 1968 § 140, (stating requirements for Presidential members of the
Copyright Tribunal).
71. This doctrine enablesjudges to perform some non-judicial functions and still conform with

Published by Scholar Commons, 2020

15

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 46, Iss. 5 [2020], Art. 7
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:765

judicial functions over subject matter related to their judicial functions must
bring to bear on the latter a unique breadth of experience that enhances the
quality of their work as federal judges. By contrast, state court judges are not
generally afforded the same opportunity to acquire additional expertise through
appointment to nonjudicial federal bodies.
It must be acknowledged that specialization is not always considered a
benefit of conferring jurisdiction on federal courts. First, the specialized and
limited nature of some federal work, such as family law, has had a deleterious
effect on the quality of judicial appointments because the work does not always
attract lawyers of the highest calibre. 2 Secondly, specialization may remove
judges from experience of local matters and distance them from the community.' Thirdly, the proliferation of specialized jurisdiction enhances the risk
of jurisdictional conflict and uncertainty."4 However, notwithstanding these
views, the advantages of specialization of labor have generally been as
powerful a force in curial life as they have been in other spheres. The recent
establishment of the Industrial Relations Court is a clear demonstration that
arguments of specialization still have currency in Australian political
thought. 5
D. Philosophy
One of the more interesting and disputed questions concerning the
allocation of federal jurisdiction is whether fundamental principles of
federalism require a federal-state division of power in the judicial branch of
government, as in the legislative and executive branches.
For reasons of
accountability, it has been argued that federal judges should interpret federal
laws. In the words of former Prime Minister Gough Whitlam, "Judges who
are called on to interpret and apply statutes should be appointed by governments responsible to the parliaments which passed those statutes. On this
basic principle alone . . federal laws should primarily be applied and
interpreted by judges appointed by the federal government. "76 Echoing this
sentiment, another writer has observed that "if the federal as well as state
governments are to be viable and able to maintain a proper balance between

the constitutional separation of judicial and executive power. See Love v. Attorney-General
(N.S.W.), 169 C.L.R. 307 (1990); Hilton v. Wells, 157 C.L.R. 57 (1985); Drake v. Minister
for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs 24 A.L.R. 577 (1979); CRAWFORD, supra note 30, at 32-33.
72. See Sir Harry Gibbs, Address at the 23rd Australian Legal Convention (Aug. 5, 1985),
The State of the Australian Judicature,59 AUSTL. L. J. 522 (1985).
73. Campbell, supranote 10, at 17; Ronald C. McCallum, A Modern Renaissance:Industrial
Law and Relations Under FederalWigs 1977-1992, 14 SYD. L. REv. 401, 429-31 (1992).
74. CRAWFORD, supra note 30, at 302.
75. See COMM. OF REV. INTO AUSTL. INDUS. REL. LAW AND Sys., supra note 63.
76. E.G. Whitlam, commenting on Byers & Toose, supra note 22, at 327.
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the two legal systems . . . each of them should
have at its disposal every
77
powers."
governmental
three
the
of
branch
On the other hand, as eminent an authority as Sir Owen Dixon 7 claimed
that "neither from the point of view of juristic principle nor from that of the
practical and efficient administration of justice can the division of the Courts
into state and federal be regarded as sound. "71 In his view, courts should be
established as an independent organ accountable neither to the Commonwealth
nor to any individual state. If established by the Constitution, courts of justice
would have responsibility for administering the entire body of law, independently of the political arms of government, and free of the "extraordinary
conception" of federal jurisdiction." The essence of this view is that the
courts are not akin to other arms of government. A judge has a duty to apply
to a case all the relevant law of the land whether its source be state or federal.
Thus the supremacy of the law makes it unnecessary to establish independent
state and federal judiciaries. Moreover, as the argument goes, the ability of
judges to apply that law without interference from other branches of
government is central to the idea of judicial independence."
In light of this difference of opinion, it is interesting to note the views of
Sir Kenneth Wheare, a well-known commentator on federalism, in reviewing
the constitutions of Australia, Canada, Switzerland, and the United States
nearly fifty years ago.
If the federal principle were to be strictly applied one would expect a dual
system to be established in a federation, one set of courts to apply and

77. W.J. VAGNER, THE FEDERAL STATES AND THEIR JUDICIARY 131 (1959). Similarly, an
Australian judge has remarked that the judiciary would otherwise be "an arm of government
without a body." Sir Francis Burt, An AustralianJudicature,56 AUSTL. L. J. 509, 511 (1982).
78. Sir Owen Dixon was a justice of the High Court from 1929-1952 and Chief Justice from
1952-1964.
79. Sir Owen Dixon, The Law and the Constitution, 51 LAw Q. REV. 590, 606 (1935). In
criticizing Australia's adherence to the United States constitutional model, Dixon claimed that
"[t]he framers of our own Federal Commonwealth Constitution (who were for the most part
lawyers) found the American instrument of government an incomparable model. They could not
escape from its fascination. Its contemplation damped the smoldering fires of their originality."
Id. at 597.
80. Id. at 607. See also Rae Else-Mitchell, Burying the Autochthonous Expedient?, 3 FED.
L. REV. 187 (1969).
81. The idea that only judges appointed by the Commonwealth should administer the laws of
the Commonwealth has been rejected by some because they argue that it subverts the principle
of judicial independence, by which judges are not directly accountable to the executive that
appointed them. See Gibbs, supra note 19, at 677-78. Similarly, in relation to Canada, the Privy
Council has stated that the role of the central government in appointing judges of provincial
superior courts promotes judicial independenceand impartiality. See Constitution Act 1867 § 96,
(1975); Toronto Corp. v. York Corp., [1938] A.C. 415, 426; 0. Martineau & Sons Ltd. v. City
of Montreal, [1932] A.C. 113, 120-21. I am grateful to Leslie Katz for this point.
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interpret the law of the general government, and another to apply and
interpret the law of each state. In fact the United States alone of the four
federations we are discussing comes near to applying this principle.82
After examining the position in each federation, Wheare concluded that
there was no uniformity among federations in the organization of their courts.
He noted, however, that whenever a federation entrusted regional courts to
apply and interpret federal laws, there was some safeguard for federal
government, such as the right of a litigant to appeal to a federal court, or the
power of the federal legislature to establish a parallel system of courts if the
need arose. 3
The contrast between these different conceptions of federalism, as it
relates to the judicial branch, might be thought of as a sterile argument of
principle, devoid of relevance to the everyday working of the courts.
However, the issue has aroused great interest in Australia in connection with
the extended debates concerning the restructuring of the judicial system.'
As a measure of that interest it is worthwhile recounting the work of a governmental committee established to report on changes to the Australian judicature.
In 1985 a Constitutional Commission was established for the purpose of
considering ways in which the Australian Constitution might be changed to
provide a suitable framework for the development of Australia as a federation
and to recognize an appropriate division of responsibilities between the state
and federal spheres of government. The Commission established an Advisory
Committee to consider, inter alia, whether separate state and federal court
systems should be retained. The Advisory Committee divided on this
question, a majority advocating the retention of separate state and federal
courts." Importantly for present purposes, two members of the majority
took the principled position advocating a single executive and a parliament
able to accept political responsibility for the courts and their administration.
In their view, the adoption of an integrated court system, which was neither
federal nor state, would produce the inevitable practical result of dividing
responsibility for the courts between the Commonwealth, state and territory
governments. Recognizing the consequent difficulties that divided responsibility would entail, the Constitutional Commission supported the Advisory

82. K.C.

WHEARE, FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 68-69 (3d ed. 1953).
83. Id. at 71.
84. Many of the proposals for change are summarized in CONST. COMM'N, AUsTL. JUD. SYS.
ADvisORY CoMM., REP. 30-34 (1987).
85. Id. at 37-43. Concerned with the declining status of the state courts, the minority

members opined that a unified system would be the best and most efficient system in the long
run. They were also of the view that while it is necessary for government to have responsibility
for the courts, it is not an essential attribute of federalism for each government to have its own
courts.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol46/iss5/7

18

Opeskin: Federal Jurisdiction in Australian Courts: Policies and Prospects

1995]

AUSTRALIAN FEDERAL JURISDICTION

Committee's general conclusions and recommended against the establishment
of an integrated court system.86
The relationship between the judicial branch of government and other
branches is clearly an important aspect of the argument for the establishment
of independent federal courts to administer federal laws. If the federal
legislature enacts new legislation, the legislature and the executive should take
responsibility for administering those laws by providing adequate resources for
their interpretation and enforcement. However, their ability to take responsibility is circumscribed when federal jurisdiction is vested in state courts. The
reason for this is that, when Parliament confers federal jurisdiction on state
courts, it must generally take those courts as it finds them; the constitution or
structure of state courts cannot be changed.
A good illustration of the difficulties that this can create is provided by
events of the 1920s and 1930s in relation to bankruptcy jurisdiction. As
discussed below," the Commonwealth first took over the field of bankruptcy
law in 1924 and invested jurisdiction in bankruptcy matters in state courts. In
providing for the administration of the new federal Act, the Commonwealth
attempted to make Commonwealth public servants Registrars of the state
supreme courts for the purpose of issuing bankruptcy notices. However, in
Le Mesurier v. Connor,88 the High Court invalidated this law because the
addition of personnel to a state court amounted to an interference with the state
court's constitution and structure. The next year, Parliament created a new
Federal Court of Bankruptcy and cited the High Court's decision as a reason
for establishing a federal court to deal with bankruptcy matters rather than
entrusting such matters to state courts.8 9
This example clearly shows that the effective administration of federal
laws may not be possible through sole reliance on the "autochthonous
expedient. " 90 The creation of federal courts, and the conferral of federal

86. CONST. COMM'N, FINAL REP., vol. 1, § 6.16 (1988). Curiously, the Commission
simultaneously rejected the view that a vital federal system requires each level of government to
have its own court system. Id. § 6.27.
87. See infra part II.F.
88. 42 C.L.R. 481 (1929).
89. C. OF AUSTL., P. DEBATES, H. OF R., 2045 (May 22, 1930). However, in practice the
Federal Court of Bankruptcy did not operate in Western Australia, and the Supreme Court of that
state continued to exercise federal jurisdiction in bankruptcy matters. So far as that state was
concerned, the constitutional difficulties presented by Le Mesurier v. Connor, 42 C.L.R. 481
(1929), were solved by amendment of the federal law to make Commonwealth officers available
to state courts, without making them officers of those courts. See CRAWFORD, supra note 30,
at 54 n.102.
90. See also Russell v. Russell, 134 C.L.R. 495 (1976) (where a federal law that required
state courts exercising family law jurisdiction to sit in camera was held invalid because it went
to the structure of the court; however, a law prohibiting state court judges from wearing robes
in family law matters was held to be merely procedural and hence valid).
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jurisdiction on them, may be necessary to ensure that laws made by the federal
legislative branch are properly administered. In this respect, the legislature
and the executive are not only responsible for the provision of adequate
financial support for the administration of federal laws. Their responsibility
extends to the appointment and removal of judges, the constitution of courts
and reform of judicial administration, and the making of rules of court.9' All
of this confirms the importance of ensuring that the federal sphere of
government comprises a legislative, executive, and judicial branch.
E. Efficacy
A further reason that has been advanced for conferring federal jurisdiction
on federal courts rather than state courts is that "the national character of the
jurisdiction and the convenience of a court not limited by State boundaries
make it appropriate to vest jurisdiction in such a court. "9 Certainly federal
courts enjoy the benefit of nationwide jurisdiction over defendants and ready
enforcement of judgments throughout Australia. For example, the legislation
establishing the Federal Court provides that "[t]he process of the Court runs,
and the judgments of the Court have effect and may be executed, throughout
Australia and the Territories."'
At one time this may have constituted a
significant advantage over state courts whose jurisdiction over absent
defendants and whose powers to execute judgments were more circumscribed.
However, the comparative advantage of conferring jurisdiction on federal
courts rather than state courts has been largely neutralized by federal
legislation. In 1992 the Commonwealth enacted the Service and Execution of
Process Act of 1992 which established a nationwide scheme for the service of
process and execution of judgments of state courts. A similar scheme has
existed in some form since the earliest years of federation, 94 but the present
scheme goes much further than its predecessor in converting Australia into a
single jurisdiction for the purpose of the service and execution of court
process. In relation to service, the Act provides simply that an initiating
process issued in one state may be served in another state. 9' Unlike the
United States and Canada,96 there is no need to establish any connection
91. Justice Connolly, The Relation Between Court and Government, in AN INTEGRATED
COURT SYSTEM FOR AUSTRALIA 35, 39-41 (Austl. Inst. of Judicial Admin. ed., 1983); Justice
Neasey, Alternatives to an IntegratedCourt System, in AN INTEGRATED COURT SYSTEM FOR

AUSTRALIA 19, 21 (Austl. Inst. of Judicial Admin. ed., 1983).
92. Durack, supra note 20, at 779.
93. Federal Court ofAustralia Act of 1976 § 18; see also Judiciary Act of 1903 § 25 (powers
of the High Court); Industrial Relations Act of 1988 § 374 (powers of the Industrial Relations
Court).
94. Service and Execution of Process Act of 1901.
95. Service and Execution of Process Act of 1992 § 15.
96. In the United States, see International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), and
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between the chosen forum and the subject-matter of the action to effect
service.' Nor is there any need to obtain the court's leave before serving
process in another state. Regarding judgments, the Act provides a simple
method of enforcement through a process of registration. A judgment
rendered by one state court may be registered in another state's court, and the
judgment then has the same force and effect as if had been given by the
registering court.9" Moreover, substantive defenses to the enforcement of a
sister state judgment, which may have been previously available under
conflicts of law rules, do not apply.99
In the light of these developments, unparalleled in Canada or the United
States, there would appear to be only marginal advantage in conferring
jurisdiction on federal courts rather than state courts by reason of the efficacy
of the proceedings.
F. History
Fortuity and historical circumstance are the final factors that have
influenced the conferral of jurisdiction on state or federal courts. Bankruptcy
jurisdiction indicates the impact of these factors. Under the Australian
Constitution, the federal Parliament has power to make laws with respect to
bankruptcy and insolvency.'00 The first federal Act passed pursuant to this
power provided for bankruptcy jurisdiction to be exercised by state courts and
In the first
by such federal courts of bankruptcy as Parliament created.'
years of the Act's operation, no federal court was created, and bankruptcy
matters were dealt with exclusively by state courts in the exercise of federal
jurisdiction. However, with the arrival of the Great Depression in the late
1920s, bankruptcy work escalated to the point where state court judges in the
most populous states of New South Wales and Victoria could not deal
adequately with the volume of work." 2 Following representations from the
state governments, the federal Parliament established the Federal Court of

its progeny. In Canada see Morguard Inv. Ltd. v. De Savoy, 3 S.C.R. 1077 (1990); Hunt v.
Lac d'Amiante du Quebec Ltee, 109 D.L.R. 4th 16 (1993). See generally, W.M.C. Gummow,
Full Faith and Creditin Three Federations,46 S.C. L. REv. 979 (1995).
97. However, a proceeding commenced in an inappropriate court may be stayed on grounds
recognizing the degree of connection between the proceeding and the forum. See Service and
Execution of Process Act of 1992 § 20.
98. Id. § 105.
99. Id. § 109. Under previous legislation, some uncertainty existed as to the availability of
substantive defenses to the enforcement of a sister state's judgment. See MICHAEL PRYLES &
PETER HANKS, FEDERAL CONFLICT OF LAWS 54-55 (1974).

100. AuSTL. CONST. § 51(xvii).
101. Bankruptcy Act of 1924 § 18.
102. C. OF AuSTL., P. DEBATES, H. OF R., 2045-46 (May 22, 1930).

Published by Scholar Commons, 2020

21

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 46, Iss. 5 [2020], Art. 7
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:765

Bankruptcy in 1930."0 In practice this newly established federal court exercised jurisdiction only in New South Wales and Victoria where there had been
serious court congestion; in other states, state courts continued to exercise
bankruptcy jurisdiction.
When the Federal Court was created in 1976, the jurisdiction of the
Federal Court of Bankruptcy was transferred to the Federal Court, and the old
court was abolished.'" However, the pre-existing situation was preserved
in so far as it was intended that the Federal Court exercise bankruptcy jurisdiction only in the two states of New South Wales and Victoria and in the
Australian Capital Territory. 5 In other states, bankruptcy jurisdiction was
exercised by the appropriate state courts. Only in 1982 did the Federal Court
begin to exercise its bankruptcy jurisdiction throughout the country. 0 6
As this brief example shows, history can be a powerful determinant of the
distribution of federal jurisdiction between state and federal courts in some
circumstances. It is difficult to explain why a federal court exercised
bankruptcy jurisdiction in some states and why state courts exercised this
jurisdiction in other states except by reference to the historical circumstances
surrounding the establishment of the Federal Court of Bankruptcy.
III. FEDERAL JURISDICTION: EXCLUSIVE OR CONCURRENT?
We have previously noted that the federal Parliament is given power
under the Australian Constitution both to confer jurisdiction on federal courts
of its creation and to invest state courts with federal jurisdiction.° 7 The
preceding Part examined why Parliament has sometimes chosen to confer
jurisdiction on federal courts rather than place sole reliance on investing state
courts with federal jurisdiction-the so-called "autochthonous expedient."
Parliament is also given power by the Constitution to make laws "[d]efining
the extent to which the jurisdiction of any federal court shall be exclusive of
that which belongs to or is invested in the courts of the States."'
Accordingly, whenever Parliament does choose to confer jurisdiction on
federal courts, a further question arises as to whether that jurisdiction should
be exclusive. That inquiry is the subject of this Part.
Some of the arguments considered in Part II, which support the conferral
of jurisdiction on federal courts, may also be adduced to support the conferral
of exclusive jurisdiction on those courts. The arguments of uniformity of

103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

Bankruptcy Act of 1930 § 4.
Bankruptcy Amendment Act of 1976 § 8.
C. OF AUSTL., P. DEBATES, H. OF R., 2282 (Nov. 3, 1976).
CRAWFORD, supra note 30, at 152.
AUSTL. CONST. §§ 77(i), 77(iii).
AuSTL. CONST § 77(i).
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interpretation and judicial specialization, for example, tend to support
exclusivity. 0 9 However, other factors appear to have had a greater influence on whether the jurisdiction conferred on federal courts is made exclusive
or concurrent. In particular, the potential for forum shopping between state
and federal courts has exerted some pressure towards the exclusive jurisdiction
of federal courts, while concerns over split jurisdictional problems, access to
justice, and the declining status of state courts, have promoted the conferral
of concurrent jurisdiction on state and federal courts. The problems discussed
here did not originate with the creation of the new federal courts in the 1970s.
Problems of exclusive and concurrent jurisdiction have existed since the High
Court of Australia was established at the dawn of Australia's federation. For
example, it has always been possible for a diversity suit to be brought either
in the High Court or in a state court,"0 and from an early date certain types
of matters were reserved to the High Court exclusively."' Greater strains
began to emerge with the conferral of jurisdiction on the Commonwealth
Industrial Court under a diverse range of federal statutes in the late 1960s and
early 1970s. It was not until the establishment of the Family Court in 1975
and the Federal Court in 1976, however, that many of these issues were
thrown into sharp relief. Accordingly, it is in the context of the experience
of the last twenty years that these issues are examined.
A. Forum Shopping
Although in the United States forum shopping has been described as a
"national legal pastime""' and has had the tacit approval of the highest
court,"' in Australia the practice has been frequently criticized by judges,
law reform bodies, and academics alike." 4 Australian cases in which judges
109. See Rogers, supra note 48, at 285; Rogers, supra note 10, at 634.
110. The High Court has jurisdiction in diversity suits by virtue of section 75 of the
Constitution, and the several courts of the states are invested with federal jurisdiction in diversity
suits by virtue of section 39(2) of the Judiciary Act of 1903. Concurrent jurisdiction in these
matters has not presented as much difficulty as might at first appear because, unlike in the United
States, the term "residents of different States" has been interpreted to exclude corporations. See
Rochford v. Dayes, 84 A.L.R. 405 (1989); Crouch v. Commissioner for Ry. (Queensl.), 159
C.L.R. 22 (1985); Australasian Temperance & Gen. Mut. Life Assurance Soc'y Ltd. v. Howe,
31 C.L.R. 290 (1922). Moreover, the High Court has power to remit a matter to another court
for trial which the Court invariably does in diversity cases. See Judiciary Act of 1903 § 44.
111. Judiciary Act of 1903 § 38. The matters within the High Court's exclusive jurisdiction
are identified principally by reference to the identity of the parties to the action, e.g. suits
between states, suits between the Commonwealth and a state, and applications for certain
prerogative writs against a Commonwealth officer.
112. J.S. Wright, The FederalCourts and the Nature and Quality of State Law, 13 WAYNE
L. REV.317, 333 (1967).
113. Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, 465 U.S. 770, 779 (1984).
114. See generally Friedrich K. Juenger, What's Wrong with Forum Shopping?, 16 SYD. L.
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have expressed their displeasure have generally involved a choice between
alternative state or territorial fora. 1 5 However, the conferral of federal
jurisdiction on state and federal courts concurrently raises a different
possibility for forum shopping. If state and federal courts have exclusive
subject-matter jurisdiction, a plaintiff generally has no option but to litigate in
the one court competent to hear the dispute. But whenever state and federal
courts have concurrent jurisdiction over the subject-matter of an action, a
choice arises between the available fora. A former Commonwealth Attorney
General, Senator Durack, recognized these problems when considering the
possibility of extending the concurrent jurisdiction of state and federal
courts. 1 6 In his view, adopting this expedient on a wide scale was likely to
introduce new problems of forum shopping in place of the old problems of
jurisdictional uncertainty.1 '7 A plaintiff would be able to choose whichever
court gave the greatest tactical advantage.
To regard the possibility of forum-shopping as a reason to refrain from
conferring concurrent jurisdiction on state and federal courts presupposes that
there is something inherently harmful in allowing plaintiffs to choose between
these courts. Not everyone would agree with this assumption. Some
commentators have hailed the resultant competition between state and federal
courts as a significant advantage of concurrent jurisdiction. One reason
advanced for this view is that forum shopping may bring about beneficial
institutional change in the administration of justice. For example, prior to the
changes made in 1987 to jurisdiction in trade practices matters, it was said
that:
If the State Supreme Courts were given concurrent jurisdiction under the
Trade Practices Act, all courts would gain an incentive to strive towards
highest levels of performance. Courts which failed to do so would simply
find that plaintiffs would take their matters elsewhere, and the8 court in
question would suffer a relative loss [of] status and influence."

REV. 5, 5-6 (1994); Opeskin, supra note 49.
115. In recent cases decided by the High Court, for example, actions have been commenced
in Queensland rather than New South Wales to avoid limitations on the assessment of damages
in motor accident cases. See Stevens v. Head, 176 C.L.R. 433 (1993); Actions have been
commenced in New South Wales rather than South Australia to avoid shorter limitation periods
in actions for personal injury. See McKain v. R.W. Miller & Co., 174 C.L.R. 1 (1991); finally
plaintiffs have brought actions in Victoria rather than the Northern Territory to avoid bars on
recovery of economic loss in motor accident cases. See Breavington v. Godleman, 169 C.L.R.
41 (1988).
116. Durack, supra note 20, at 782.
117. As to the latter, see discussion infra part III.B.
118. Rogers, supra note 10, at 648 (quoting G. de Q. Walker, Submission to the Trade
Practices Consultative Comm.).
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Resuming this argument elsewhere, 1 9 the commentator stated that
conferring concurrent jurisdiction on state and federal courts would help to
establish a competitive judicial market. In such an environment judges would
have an incentive to administer trade practices cases in the most efficient
manner possible to attract more cases to their court in an inherently interesting
area of law.
As interesting as this argument is, it would appear to be flawed in two
respects. First, the argument assumes that the advantages accruing to a
plaintiff in choosing one court system will invariably translate into communal
benefits in the way the system of justice is administered. However, there may
be many rigidities in a market system that prevent the predicted institutional
change. Second, in so far as the argument focuses on one systemic effect of
competition between the courts, it takes no account of other costs of
competition. One such cost is the harm to an individual defendant, who is
unable to determine the legal consequences of his or her actions until such
time as the plaintiff chooses a forum. Furthermore, by permitting a plaintiff
to select either forum, with the consequential impact on the rights and
obligations of both parties, a country's compliance with the rule of law may
be jeopardized. o
Assuming then that the practice of forum shopping is properly to be
discouraged, there is reason to favor the conferral of exclusive jurisdiction on
federal courts over the conferral of concurrent jurisdiction with the states. The
extent of that preference must depend, however, on the degree to which
differences between the courts' proceedings provide plaintiffs with a real
incentive to engage in forum shopping. From a formal point of view, there
are few strong incentives for plaintiffs to engage in federal-state forum
shopping in the Australian judicial system. There are several reasons for this.
First, most matters of federal jurisdiction that arise in state or federal courts
are matters arising under the Constitution or under laws made by the federal
Parliament.' Consequently, the relevant federal law itself provides the rule
of decision except in relation to procedural issues that arise in the course and
conduct of litigation."
Second, all courts exercising federal jurisdiction are required by statute
to apply the laws of the state or territory in which they sit except to the extent

119. G. de Q. Walker, Competition Between Courts:Bane or Bounty?, 55 AUSTL. L. J. 312,
313-14 (1981).
120. See Opeskin, supra note 49.
121. AUSTL. CONST. §§ 76(i) - (ii).
122. P.E. NYGH, CONFLICT OF LAWS IN AUSTRALIA 255 (5th ed. 1991); PRYLES & HANKS,
supra note 99, at 192. Of course, procedural issues may have a significant bearing on the
outcome of a case from a litigant's point of view. The description of such matters as procedural
is no reflection on their practical importance.
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that the Constitution or federal law requires otherwise." z This provision,
closely modelled on an early Act of the United States Congress, 2 4 is
intended to ensure the harmonious relationship between the systems of state
and federal law administered within each state."z The effect of the provision is that a court exercising federal jurisdiction in a particular state will
generally apply the one body of law to a matter before it, irrespective of
whether the court is a state or federal court. The incentive to engage in forum
shopping between state and federal courts within any given state is therefore
minimized. On the other hand, the provision facilitates forum shopping
between a court exercising federal jurisdiction in one state and a court
exercising federal jurisdiction in another state.' 26 The section thus shows a
clear preference for uniformity in all judicial proceedings commenced within
a state over uniformity in the administration of all federal law. 27 This
preference may result in the disparate treatment from state to state of
individuals whose rights and duties arise under federal law, but this lack of
uniformity has been held not to infringe the Constitution, at least in a criminal
Context. 121

123. Judiciary Act of 1903 § 79.
124. Judiciary Act of 1789 § 34 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1987)). The provision now
states: "The laws of the several states, except where the Constitution or treaties of the United
States or Acts of Congress otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision
in civil actions in the courts of the United States, in cases where they apply." Id.
125. See, e.g., Musgrave v. Commonwealth, 57 C.L.R. 514 (1937). In that case, a New
South Wales resident commenced a libel action against a Queensland defendant in the High
Court's diversity jurisdiction. The action was time barred in Queensland where the cause of
action arose. However, Chief Justice Latham held that the action could be maintained in New
South Wales because the High Court was obliged by § 79 to apply the longer limitation period
applicable in New South Wales, where the court sat. Id.
126. For example, a litigant may choose freely between commencing a federal court action in
any registry of the court with the consequence that, subject to the matter being transferred to
another registry, the law of the chosen state will be applied. These factors have led some
commentators to recommend amendment of section 79 of the Judiciary Act of 1903 to avoid the
prospect of forum shopping. See Enid Campbell, FederalContractLaw, 44 AUSTL. L. J. 580,
582 (1970); P.H.L., Recent Cases-Notes and Comments, 41 AUSTL. L. J. 210, 212 (1967).
127. The Australian Law Reform Commission challenged this approach in relation to the rules
of evidence applied in federal courts. Until 1995, federal courts were required to apply different
rules of evidence depending on the state or territory in which they exercised their jurisdiction.
In recommending that a uniform law of evidence be adopted in all federal courts, the Commission
commented that it was unsatisfactory for the outcome of a case under federal law to depend on
the state in which the trial took place. Although the implementation of these recommendations
might result in forum shopping between state and federal courts within a state, the Commission
thought that this was unlikely to occur, at least in criminal matters. See Ausm. L. REFORM
COmm., EVIDENCE, Rep. No. 26, 108-18 (1985); AUSTL. L. REFORM COMM., EVIDENCE, Rep.
No. 38, 10-13 (1987). The federal Parliament recently enacted the Evidence Act of 1995, giving
effect to the Commission's recommendations for a uniform evidence law for federal courts.
128. Leeth v. Australia, 174 C.L.R. 455 (1992), concerned the constitutional validity of a
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Third, certain federal laws discourage federal/state forum shopping.
Foremost among these is the provision for the transfer of proceedings between
federal courts and superior state courts under the crossvesting scheme
introduced in 1987. The scheme is outlined further below, 9 but in essence
it permits a court in which a proceeding has been commenced to transfer the
proceeding to another participating court. 130 Given that a court may transfer
a proceeding on the application of a party to the proceeding or on its own
motion,' and that there is no appeal from a transfer decision, 132 the
evident intent of the legislation is that there be an expeditious and final
determination of the appropriate forum for litigation. 133 A further incentive
for plaintiffs to commence proceedings in the state or federal system, as
appropriate, is that they may be 34subject to an adverse costs ruling if they bring
suit in an inappropriate forum. 1
Notwithstanding the absence of formal differences between litigating in
state and federal courts, at the end of the day there are several less tangible
disparities that may incline litigants to favor one court system over the other.
It is often said, for example, that the Federal Court can offer parties a more
speedy trial than state courts in certain matters due to its method of active case
management. 35 There may also be some cost incentive to litigate small

federal law requiring the minimum sentence of a federal offender to be set in like manner to a
state offender tried in that state. Because each Australian state has markedly different laws with
respect to the nonparole period, an offender against federal law may serve a different term of
imprisonment according to the state in which he or she is tried and sentenced. Over a vigorous
dissent, a majority of the High Court upheld the law, stating that the Constitution did not require
Commonwealth laws to have a uniform operation on individuals throughout the Commonwealth.
Id. at 467. The majority also remarked that the federal law in question served the important
purpose of avoiding disharmony that would otherwise result if prisoners serving their sentences
in the same prison were subject to different regimes regarding parole. Id. at 466, 472. As with
section 79 of the Judiciary Act of 1903, the majority's decision demonstrates a preference for
intrastate uniformity at the expense of interstate diversity.
129. See infra part IV.C.
130. Jurisdiction of Courts (Cross-vesting) Act of 1987 § 5, and cognate state acts.
131. Id.§ 5(7).
132. Id.§ 13(a).
133. In Bankinvest A.G. v. Seabrook, 14 N.S.W.L.R. 711, 714, (1988), Chief Justice Street
stated that a decision to transfer a proceeding called for:
a 'nuts and bolts' management decision as to which court, in the pursuit of the
interests of justice, is the more appropriate to hear and determine the substantive
dispute. Consideration of textured principle and deep learning-in particular
principles of international law such as forum non conveniens-have no place in a
cross-vesting adjudication.
134. The Federal Court Rules provide that, if the court believes that the claim could more
suitably have been brought in another court or tribunal, any costs to be paid will be reduced by
one-third. See Federal Court Rules, 0. 62, r. 36A(2).
135. MCKEOUGH & STEWART, supra note 57, at 39.
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claims in state courts. 36 Rightly or wrongly, litigants may have greater
confidence in the quality of decisions of the federal courts. Some commentators have predicted that factors such as these might lead to a drift toward
litigants choosing federal courts over state courts in important litigation.' 37
If that is so, and if forum shopping is to be discouraged, it is arguable that
federal jurisdiction should not be conferred concurrently on state and federal
courts.

B. Split JurisdictionalProblems
All who have addressed themselves to the question of a dual
system of courts appear to have accepted as a prime requisite of
any such system that litigants be given the opportunity to have
determined in one court and in the one proceeding the matters in
38
dispute between them.

This view, expressed by a judge of the New South Wales Supreme Court,
is a laudable sentiment commonly voiced by those concerned with federal-state
court relations in Australia. 139 At the heart of the comment is the conviction
that disputes over jurisdiction within a federal system are futile and unproductive because they involve the expenditure of considerable public and private
resources without reaching the merits of the parties' dispute.
An inappropriate division of jurisdiction between state and federal courts
may present a serious threat to the goal of having one court adjudicate all
disputed issues between the parties. If a federal court is able to resolve only
some of the relevant issues because of limitations on its jurisdiction, the parties
may be forced to pursue the remainder of their claim in the state court system,
with consequent expense and delay. Split jurisdictional problems such as these
were a common feature of federal-state court relations during the 1980s, and
they arose in a variety of circumstances. 40 It is instructive, however, to

136. The Federal Court Rules provide that if the plaintiff is awarded judgment of less than
$100,000 as a money sum or as damages, any costs will be reduced by one-third unless the court
orders otherwise. See Federal Court Rules, 0. 62, r. 36A(1).
137. CONST. COMM'N, AUSTL. JUD. SYs. ADVISORY COMM., supra note 84 at 42.
138. Rogers, supra note 48, at 288.
139. See also Street, supra note 10, at 435, who commented that "[i]t cannot, I believe, be
stated too often, too loudly or too clearly that the ideal court is one that can administer the whole
of the law of the land in the course of the one case between the litigants who are in dispute."
140. Split jurisdictional problems sometimes arose on appeal as well as in the exercise of
original jurisdiction, as where a federal court had exclusive appellate jurisdiction over a federal
matter but no appellate jurisdiction over a non-federal matter. See Sir Harry Gibbs, Developments in the Jurisdictionof FederalCourts, 12 U. QUEENSL. L. J. 3, 9 (1981); F.J. Bloemen
Pty. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Taxation, 55 A.L.J.R. 451 (1981).
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examine two situations that typified the difficulties experienced in that period,
relating to commercial law and to family law.
The first example of split jurisdictional problems arises in the context of
the consumer protection provisions of the trade practices legislation. As
mentioned above, the Federal Court once exercised exclusive jurisdiction over
proceedings arising under the Trade Practices Act. 4' However, some claims
under that Act bear a great similarity to common law claims subject to the
plenary jurisdiction of the state courts. For example, an action may be
brought under the Trade Practices Act for damages where a corporation has
engaged in misleading or deceptive conduct in breach of section 52 of the Act.
Such a claim is often similar to a common law claim in tort for passing off,
and not infrequently a plaintiff will wish to plead both causes of action. In the
1980s the question arose whether the Federal Court, in exercising its exclusive
statutory jurisdiction over section 52 matters, could also determine the allied
common law claim. If the Federal Court had no jurisdiction over the common
law claim and state courts had no jurisdiction over the federal claim, there was
a real prospect that neither court system could deal with the whole of the
parties' dispute. Split jurisdictional problems such as these raised the specter
of litigation on jurisdictional issues, multiple proceedings, and inadequate
redress of the parties' grievances.
The second example concerns jurisdiction in relation to the custody of
children. Although this is a complex area of law, it is possible to give an
overview of some of the difficulties that have arisen. 42 The Australian
Constitution grants power to Parliament to make laws with respect to
"marriage" and "[d]ivorce and matrimonial causes; and in relation thereto,
parental rights, and the custody and guardianship of infants."'
Although
some federal legislation had previously been enacted pursuant to these
powers,'" in 1975 the Commonwealth passed the Family Law Act to

141. See supra part II.B.
142. See generally, Owen Jessep & Richard Chisholm, Custody Jurisdiction in the Family
Court, 12 FED. L. REv. 281 (1981); Owen Jessep & Richard Chisholm, Children, the

Constitution and the Family Court, 8 U.N.S.W. L. J. 152 (1985); Dorothy Kovacs, The Child
Under the Family Law Act: Recent Developments, 12 MONASH U. L. REv. 133 (1986); Gavan
Griffith, ConstitutionalIssues in Family Law (pts. I & II), 5(4) AUSTL. FAM. LAw. 1 (1990),
6(1) AUSTL. FAM. LA\v. 6 (1990); ANTHONY DICKEY, FAMILY LAW 14-41 (2d ed. 1990); I.W.P.
McCall, Family Courts-Some JurisdictionalQuestions, 7 AUSTL. J. FAM. L. 43 (1993).
143. AUSTL. CONST. ch. I, pt. V, §§ 51(xxi) & (xxii), respectively. These are the principal,
but not the only, Commonwealth powers with respect to family law. Thus, federal legislative
power over "immigration and emigration" and "external affairs" has been held to validate various
provisions of the Family Law Act 1975. See Re Vaughan, [1980] F.L.C. 90-888, at 75,606
(withholding the passport of a child under threat of being removed from Australia); In the
Marriage of Blair, 90 F.L.R. 182, 194-95 (1988) (recognizing overseas custody orders).
144. Principally, these were the Matrimonial Causes Act 1959, which gave Australia its first
unified law of divorce, and the Marriage Act 1961, which unified the law relating to marriage.
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provide a new nationwide scheme with respect to divorce, child custody,
maintenance and property settlement.145 The Act rested principally on the
marriage power, 146 which placed immediate constraints on its scope. In
relation to child custody, for example, it was held early on that the Family
Law Act applied only to the natural or adopted children of both parties to the
marriage 147 and that, accordingly, the Act could not regulate the custody of
ex-nuptial children of the husband or wife, or the custody of a child of other
parents, even though the child lived as a member of the family of the husband
and wife (for example, a foster child). The need for a constitutional linkage
between child custody and marriage thus presented considerable difficulty for
the federal government in providing comprehensively for the custody of
children, especially in light of the increasing variety of family arrangements
and the government's desire to extend the reach of federal family law as far
as possible.'4 8
The limitations on the scope of the marriage power in the present context
are important because they translated directly into jurisdictional difficulties for
the courts. The Family Law Act created a new federal court, the Family
Court, to exercise jurisdiction under the Act and conferred jurisdiction on the
Court which was largely exclusive of that of the states. 49 However, the
federal jurisdiction conferred on the Family Court was necessarily confined to
the types of jurisdiction enumerated in sections 75 and 76 of the Constitu-

145. See generally, Kep Enderby, The Family Law Act: Background to the Legislation, 1
U.N.S.W. L. J. 10 (1975).
146. AUSTL. CONST. ch. I, pt. V, §§ 51(xxii) was not widely relied on because proceedings
for ancillary relief, such as custody and guardianship, could only be brought in the context of
divorce or nullity proceedings. The Family Law Act, however, sought to enable custody and
other proceedings to be brought independently of proceedings for the dissolution or nullity of a
marriage.
147. Russell v. Russell, 134 C.L.R. 495, 542-43 (1976) (Mason, J.); see also In the Marriage
of Cormick, 156 C.L.R. 170 (1984); The Queen v. Cook, Ex Parte C., 156 C.L.R. 249 (1985);
Re F., Ex Parte F., 161 C.L.R. 376 (1986). For similar reasons it was also held that custody
proceedings could be instituted only by parties to the marriage and not by third persons. Russell,
134 C.L.R. at 542-43 (1976) (Mason, J.). However, this interpretation has gradually given way
in subsequent cases. See Dowal v. Murray, 143 C.L.R. 410 (1981); Vitzdamm-lones v.
Vitzdamm-Jones, 148 C.L.R. 383 (1978); Fountain v. Alexander, 150 C.L.R. 615 (1982); V.
v. V., 156 C.L.R. 228 (1985).
148. See JOINT SELEcT COMM. ON THE FAMILY LAW ACT, FAMILY LAW IN AUSTL., § 4.57
(1980) (recommending that the Family Law Act be amended to the fullest extent permitted by the
Constitution to ensure that the Family Court has jurisdiction to deal with all matters affecting
child custody, guardianship, and access).
149. Family Law Act 1975 §§ 39(1)(a) & 40, and Proclamations made thereunder. There are
two important exceptions which relate, first, to the state of Western Australia, where a state
family court was established, and, secondly, to state courts of summary jurisdiction, which were
given jurisdiction in relation to certain limited proceedings under the Act.
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tion.150 In so far as section 76(ii) enabled jurisdiction to be conferred on
federal courts with respect to matters "arising under any laws made by
Parliament," constitutional restrictions on the power of Parliament to make
laws with respect to the custody of children ensured that the jurisdiction of the
Family Court was similarly constrained.
The practical difficulties stemming from these jurisdictional limitations
soon became widely known. If a family comprised both children of a
marriage and ex-nuptial children, a dispute over custody would have to be
determined in two different courts: the former in the Family Court and the
latter in a state court. Worse still, in exceptional situations neither a state nor
federal court was competent to determine the particular custody proceedings
brought before it. 5 ' Commenting on this discreditable situation in 1983, a
governmental committee expressed
its most serious concern and dismay regarding the effect which the present
distribution of family law powers has had on the personal lives of ordinary
members of the community. Persons who are unfortunate enough to
experience difficulty in their matrimonial and family life have had those
difficulties greatly exacerbated by the added delay, uncertainty and anxiety
created by the protracted and prolonged constitutional litigation needed to
clarify the boundaries of Commonwealth and State power." 2
Understandably, the split jurisdictional problems considered above have
tended to bring the legal system into disrepute and have given rise to
considerable pressure for reform. The worst of the problems have now been
solved as a result of developments in the late 1980s, such as the growth of the
doctrine of accrued jurisdiction, the cross-vesting of jurisdiction, and the
referral of legislative power from the states to the Commonwealth, which are
considered further below.'53 Another solution has been to broaden the
concurrent jurisdiction of state and federal courts independently of the crossvesting legislation, since the broader the area of concurrence, the lesser the
risk that jurisdiction over a particular dispute will be split between two court
systems. 114 To this extent, split jurisdictional problems between state and

150. AUSTL. CONST. ch. III, § 77(i).
151. See, e.g., Clarke v. Melnnes, 1 N.S.W. L. R. 598 (1978) (rejecting for want of
jurisdiction child custody applications by father and grandparents made to separate courts after
death of the children's mother). For the judge's extracurial criticisms, see Michael M. Helsham,
Correspondence,52 AUSTL. L. J. 466 (1978).
152. CONST. COMM'N, ADVISORY COMM. ON THE DISTRIBUTION OF POwERS, REP. § 4.45
(1987).
153. See infra pt. IV.
154. See Rogers, supra note 48, at 288 (concurrent trade practices jurisdiction).
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federal courts have been a significant catalyst in the expansion of concurrent
jurisdiction of state courts in matters of federal jurisdiction.
C. Access To Justice
A third factor relevant to the allocation of exclusive or concurrent
jurisdiction to state and federal courts is access to justice. In recent years state
and federal governments have attempted to enhance access to justice for all
Australians through the provision of a fairer, more efficient, and more
effective legal system. Although the goal of such reforms is to improve the
operation of the legal system across the board, if the state court system
provides greater access to justice than the federal system, it is arguable those
courts should be given concurrent jurisdiction in matters of federal jurisdiction.
The importance of access to justice as a determinant of state and federal
court jurisdiction has long been apparent in the consumer protection provisions
of the Trade Practices Act 1974, whose history provides a useful illustration
of the issues. When first enacted, the Trade Practices Act conferred exclusive
jurisdiction on a federal court in consumer protection matters. However, this
was always regarded as a temporary measure to allow for the development of
a coherent body of jurisprudence in a new area of law.155 Implicit in this
view may have been an unexplained preference for conferring jurisdiction in
consumer protection matters on state courts in the longer term. A possible
reason for this attitude was suggested by a committee established in 1976 to
review the operation and effect of the Trade Practices Act. 156 After noting
that the conferral of exclusive jurisdiction on the Australian Industrial Court
was unnecessarily restrictive, the committee stated its view as follows:
At the present time, State courts exercise federal jurisdiction in a wide
range of matters. The Committee believes such courts should be given
jurisdiction also on matters arising under Commonwealth consumer laws.
Such an extension would be of assistance to both State consumer agencies,
and the public generally, to whom State courts57 are more familiar and
accessible than the Australian Industrial Court. 1
The committee based its recommendation for concurrent jurisdiction on
the idea of access to justice, insofar as state courts were thought to be more
familiar and accessible to the public than the Industrial Court. Similarly, in
1979 another governmental committee recommended, in the course of

155. C. OF AUSTL., P. DEBATES H. OF R., 234 (July 16, 1974).
156. TRADE PRACTICES ACT REvIEw COMM., REP. To THE MINISTER FOR BUSINESS AND

CONSUMER AFFAIRS,
157. Id. at § 9.35.

§§ 9.35, 11.49 (1976).
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reviewing the effect of competition policy on small businesses in Australia,
that jurisdiction under the consumer protection provisions of the Trade
Practices Act be conferred on state courts."5 8 It had been suggested to the
committee that small businesses would benefit by being able to have access to
the simpler procedures of the various state courts, should they wish to use the
provisions of the Act to protect their positions. The committee agreed with
this submission and concluded that "any disadvantages which might arise out
of the inconsistent decisions which could occur initially are far outweighed by
the benefits to small businesses, consumers and other less powerful litigants
who would thereby obtain ready access to the Courts."' 59 In 1987 as a
result of these recommendations, the federal Parliament conferred concurrent
jurisdiction on state and territory courts in relation to consumer protection
matters arising under Division 1 and 1A of Part V of the Trade Practices
Act.
When introducing the amending legislation into Parliament, the
Attorney-General, Mr. Bowen, commented that the community's best interests
were not necessarily well served by the Federal Court's exclusive jurisdiction
in these matters because cases arising under these Divisions were often
disputes of local character, better dealt with in a state court.16' Reviewing
these developments, the issue of access to justice appears to have been a
paramount consideration in the ultimate investiture of
state courts with
62
concurrent jurisdiction in consumer protection matters.1

158. 1 TRADE PRACTICES CONSULTATIVE

COMM.,

SMALL BUSINESS AND

THE TRADE

PRACTICES ACT (1979). The Committee made a similar recommendation in relation to restrictive
trade practices under part IV of the Act.
159. Id. §§ 12.34 - 12.36.
160. Jurisdiction of Courts (Miscellaneous Amendments) Act 1987. In 1992 the Trade
Practices Act 1974 was again amended to provide for concurrent state jurisdiction in matters
arising under part IVA of the Act, which relates to unconscionable conduct. See Trade Practices
Legislation Amendment Act 1992. It should be noted that since 1985, fair trading legislationhas
been introduced in all states and territories in terms that mirror part V, div. 1, Trade Practices
Act 1974. The fair trading legislation allows certain consumer protection claims to be brought
in state courts in circumstances where the protections of the Trade Practices Act 1974 may not
be available, as where an individual, rather than a corporation, engages in the relevant conduct.
161. C. OF AUSTL., P' DEBATES, H. OF R., 2557 (Oct. 22, 1986).
162. Issues of access and costs have again received attention in relation to trade practices
matters. See AUSTRALIAN LAW REFORM COMM'N, COMPLIANCE WITH THE TRADE PRACTICES
ACT 1974, Rep. No. 68, §§ 5.1-5.30 (1994). The commission noted that there are numerous
barriers to private enforcement of the Act, especially for consumers and small businesses.
Litigation in the Federal Court or in the Supreme Court of a state or territory is often expensive
and complex. However, many lower courts could also grant relief in disputes under the Act, and
these courts were less intimidating, faster in disposing of matters, more widely dispersed
geographically, and less costly than superior courts. The commission recommended that where
lower courts had been granted power to grant appropriate remedies, more should be done to
promote the fact that consumer protection matters could be conducted in those courts. Where
state governments had not granted such powers to lower courts, it recommended that jurisdiction

Published by Scholar Commons, 2020

33

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 46, Iss. 5 [2020], Art. 7
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:765

Although the above example relates to trade practices law, it is clear that
access to justice may have a bearing on the allocation of jurisdiction in other
areas of federal law. The Access to Justice Advisory Committee has recently
reported that individuals face many barriers in accessing justice effectively,
including physical accessibility, information on legal services, high legal and
court costs, availability of legal aid, and delays in adjudicating disputes. 63
It is difficult to make a comparative assessment of all these factors for state
and federal courts, partly because of the diversity of practices in the various
courts, and partly because of lack of comparable data."' 4 However, it is
instructive to examine two such factors.
In respect of physical accessibility, federal courts appear to be generally
less accessible than the various state courts. The Federal Court has only one
registry in each state and territory,"' s and although the Court is empowered
to sit anywhere in Australia if it so chooses," 6 sittings are seldom held
outside the capital city where the registry is located. The Family Court, which
has registries and conducts hearings in major country centers and in capital
cities, is somewhat better placed, but geographic factors are still regarded as
a major impediment to access to justice. 67 By contrast, the state Supreme
Courts usually maintain registries and conduct regular sittings in capital cities
and large country towns throughout the state. Moreover, the extensive
network of District Courts and Local Courts within each state court system
provides a high degree of accessibility for litigants in relation to matters that
fall within the jurisdiction of those courts.' 6 8 As an illustration of the
importance of these issues, it is worth noting that geographic accessibility was
a central issue in the Australian Law Reform Commission's review of the

be conferred on those courts. Although these arguments are not directed to the balance of
jurisdiction between state and federal courts, but to the balance between state courts themselves,
they reflect the same concerns for access to justice evident in the reports of the earlier
committees.
163. ACCESS To JUSTICE ADVISORY COMM., ACCESS To JUSTICE: AN ACTION PLAN (1994).
164. The Access to Justice Advisory Committee has criticized the lack of uniformity in the
collection of court statistics in civil cases. Id. §§ 17.49-17.68; see also P. Lane, CourtManagement Information, AUSTRALIAN INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, DISCUSSION PAPER
(1993).
165. Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 § 34 empowers the Governor-General to establish
such registries as he or she thinks fit, with at least one registry in each state and territory.
166. Id. § 12.
167. FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA, ANN. REP. 1991-1992, at 8-9 (1992).
168. Sir Garfield Barwick once remarked, in relation to the growth of district and county
courts in the states, that "because the districts within which they operate are spread throughout
the country, the law is brought close to the citizen, losing much of that sense of remoteness which
courts sitting in the capital cities of the States tend to engender." See Barwick, supra note 29,
at 492.
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allocation of admiralty jurisdiction between state and federal courts. 6 9 In
particular, the Commission rejected the possibility of conferring exclusive
admiralty jurisdiction on the Federal Court because a considerable amount of
admiralty work in Australia was based in coastal towns in which the Federal
Court had no presence and was never likely to have a presence. 7 ' The
Commission recommended that in rem admiralty jurisdiction be conferred on
the Federal Court and on the state Supreme Courts concurrently, and
Parliament soon adopted the suggested reforms.'
In a similar vein, the imposition of court fees presents a further barrier
to justice which may differentiate state and federal courts. Most Australian
courts impose fees on litigants for use of the court system and ancillary
services, helping to defray the cost of administering the courts by seeking
contribution from the direct users of the system. These fees have tended to
escalate rapidly in recent years' to the point where they form a very
significant component of overall costs to litigants. 7 3 Once again it is
difficult to draw clear conclusions about the comparative accessibility of state
and federal courts. However, a rough comparison of Federal Court fees with
those of state and territory Supreme Courts suggests that the former are
notably greater than the latter, with the possible exception of the Supreme
Court of New South Wales.
The importance to be attached to access to justice issues in determining
the allocation of jurisdiction between state and federal courts must clearly
depend on the subject-matter in question. There is probably little point in
conferring jurisdiction on lower state courts in admiralty matters. 74
However, in matters that are likely to affect the daily lives of citizens, access
to justice is a consideration to be weighed in determining whether the
jurisdiction of federal courts should be exclusive of, or concurrent with, that
of the states.
D. Court Status

The final argument meriting consideration is that the conferral of
exclusive jurisdiction on federal courts will cause a deterioration in the
reputation and status of the state Supreme Courts. There is little room for

169. AUSTRL. LAW REFORM COMM'N, supra note 34, §§ 217-43.
170. Id. § 231.
171. Admiralty Act 1988 § 10.
172. It has been estimated that between 1965 and 1985 the amount collected through court fees
in the Supreme Court of New South Wales rose by almost 750 %. See A. Barnard & G. Withers,
Financingthe AustralianCourts, AUSTRALIAN INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION (1989).
173. SENATE STANDING COMMITTEE ON LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS, THE COST
OF JUSTICE SECOND REPORT: CHECKS AND IMBALANCES 82 (1993).

174. See AUSTRL. LAW REFORM COMM'N, supra note 34, § 240-41; Admiralty Act 1988 § 11.
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doubt that before the growth of federal jurisdiction in the 1970s, the state
Supreme Courts were generally regarded by the community and the profession
as courts of high standard. Yet, as social regulation by federal law has
increased over the years, a wider range of matters has fallen within the scope
of federal jurisdiction. To the extent that this jurisdiction has been vested in
federal courts rather than state courts, there has been a corresponding decline
in the role and function of state courts, leading some observers to fear that, if
the jurisdiction of the federal courts continues to expand, state courts will
become increasingly restricted in the scope of their jurisdiction. This does not
mean that the volume of work done by those courts would necessarily decline
but that "much of the variety might go, leading to a decline in the quality 5of
appointees to State courts and a consequent, if gradual, loss of prestige. "17
It is perhaps unsurprising that these views have been most commonly
expressed by state court judges,17 but this is not to say that their concerns
are unfounded.177 First, many people consider the trial work of the state
Supreme Courts to be less varied and stimulating than that of the federal
courts. Secondly, the terms and conditions of appointment to judicial office
in the state courts are often less attractive than those applicable to federal
courts. Thirdly, in circumstances where state court decisions are subject to
appeal to a federal court, "[i]t is idle to contend that the creation of a court
which sits on appeal from the decisions of state supreme courts does not affect
the status, dignity and reputation of the latter courts. "178
There is no doubt that the federal government has been sensitive to the
need to maintain a viable and respected judicial system at the state level. In
this respect, principles of federalism are manifest in the judicial branch, as in
other branches, of government in Australia. It is noteworthy, for example,
that when jurisdictional reforms were undertaken in 1976 to divest the High
Court of much of its original jurisdiction and invest that jurisdiction in the
state courts, the changes were hailed as an important boost to the status and
authority of state courts. 7 9 The expansion of the state courts' concurrent
federal jurisdiction, and a reduction of the federal courts' exclusive jurisdiction, is clearly one answer to the concerns held for the status of state courts.
But even these changes may not allay fears if litigants continue to be attracted
to the forum of a federal court.

175.
176.
177.
178.
179.

CONST. COMM'N, AUSTRL. JUD. Sys. ADVISORY COMM., supra note 84, § 3.53.
See supra note 10.
Contra Bowen, supra note 25, at 813.
Campbell, supra note 10, at 18.
C. OF AUSTL., P. DEBATES, H. OF R., 2946 (June 3, 1976).
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IV.

RECENT JURISDICTIONAL DEVELOPMENTS IN AUSTRALIA

The legal and practical difficulties that have arisen from the expansion of
federal courts and federal jurisdiction since the 1970s have engendered a
number of significant developments in the jurisdiction of state and federal
courts in Australia. This Part examines three of these developments, namely,
the evolution of the associated and accrued jurisdiction of federal courts, the
reference of legislative power from the states to the Commonwealth in relation
to child custody, and the establishment of a scheme for cross-vesting the
jurisdiction of superior state and federal courts in Australia. The first of these
developments owes much to the jurisprudence of United States courts in
relation to pendent jurisdiction, but the latter two are uniquely Australian in
character.
All three developments have had several material effects. First, they have
all gone some way to alleviating the split jurisdictional problems experienced
by litigants by enabling one court to adjudicate all matters in dispute between
the parties. Secondly, the developments have altered the balance of jurisdiction between state and federal courts, though not all in the same way. In the
case of accrued jurisdiction and the reference of state powers, there has been
an expansion of the jurisdiction of the federal courts at the expense of the state
courts, whereas the cross-vesting scheme, by enlarging the concurrent
jurisdiction of state and federal courts, has had a more equivocal effect. And
thirdly, there have been consequential effects on the status of state and federal
courts.
A. Associated and Accrued Jurisdiction
In the last two decades there have been two related developments in the
jurisdiction of federal courts which have had the effect of expanding their
jurisdiction and ameliorating the split jurisdictional problems sometimes
experienced in those courts. The first of these has its basis in federal statutes
that confer jurisdiction on federal courts in matters "associated" with matters
already within the courts' jurisdiction. The second has its basis in judicial
development of the doctrine of accrued jurisdiction along lines similar to the
American doctrine of pendent jurisdiction. 8 °
In relation to the doctrine of associated jurisdiction, section 32(1) of the
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 provides that "To the extent that the
Constitution permits, jurisdiction is conferred on the Court in respect of
matters not otherwise within its jurisdiction that are associated with matters in

180. On the American developments, see generally ERWIN CHERMERINSKY, FEDERAL
JURISDICTION § 5.4 (1989); CHARLES A. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 114-21 (5th
ed. 1994).
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which the jurisdiction of the Court is invoked."' Similar provision is made
in respect of other federal courts."U Some doubt was initially expressed as
to the meaning of the prefatory phrase in the section, but the High Court has
held that the phrase refers to all the legislative power of the Commonwealth
regarding matters of federal jurisdiction. 83 Accordingly, associated jurisdiction aims to bring within the sphere of an existing federal claim an associated
matter that is still a federal matter within the meaning of sections 75 and 76
of the Constitution, but in respect of which jurisdiction has not otherwise been
conferred on the federal court in question. Bearing in mind that federal courts
other than the High Court have jurisdiction only in areas specifically conferred
by Act of Parliament, the doctrine of associated jurisdiction extends the court's
jurisdiction in individual cases to associated federal questions.
An example of the operation of associated jurisdiction is provided by
Allied Mills Industries pty. Ltd. v. Trade Practices Commission.'84 In that
case the Trade Practices Commission brought proceedings in the Federal Court
against Allied Mills for breach of section 45 of the Trade Practices Act. 185
In the course of the proceedings, a former manager of Allied Mills gave the
Commission a number of commercially sensitive documents which the
company wished to keep confidential. The company brought a cross-claim in
which it sought to restrain the Commission from using or disclosing the
information contained in the documents on the grounds that the Commission
was acting tortiously and in breach of a duty of confidence. The question thus
arose whether the Federal Court had jurisdiction over the cross-claim, given
that it was founded on common law and equitable causes of action that were
not generally within the Court's jurisdiction. In the result, the Court held that
it did have jurisdiction over the cross-claim because the cross-claim was
associated with the principal matter and was itself a federal matter. The Trade
Practices Commission was an emanation of "the Commonwealth," and the
cross-claim was therefore a matter in which the Commonwealth was a party,
within the meaning of section 75(iii) of the Constitution.
A more challenging question is whether a federal court can exercise
jurisdiction in non-federal matters by means of the doctrine of accrued
jurisdiction. The purpose of such a doctrine is to bring within the scope of an

181. Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 § 32(1); see generally W.M.C. Gummow, Pendent
JurisdictioninAustralia-Section32 ofthe FederalCourtofAustraliaAct 1976, 10 FED. L. REV.
211 (1979).
182. Family Law Act 1975 § 33; Industrial Relations Act 1988 § 430.
183. Philip Morris Inc. v. Adam P. Brown Male Fashions Pty. Ltd., 148 C.L.R. 457, 494
(1981) (Gibbs, J.), 516 (Mason, J.), 538 (Aickin, J.); contra, id. at 478 (Barwick, C.J.), 520-21
(Murphy, J.).
184. 34 A.L.R. 105 (1981).
185. Section 45 prohibits a corporation from making or giving effect to a contract,
arrangement, or understanding substantially lessening competition.
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existing federal claim another claim that is non-federal and over which a
federal court would not otherwise have jurisdiction. The High Court took the
first steps toward adopting such a doctrine in relation to its own jurisdiction
in the 1940s,' 86 but it was not until the question arose in relation to the
Federal Court in the 1980s that the doctrine of accrued jurisdiction came into
full bloom. In each case the vehicle for attaching the non-federal claim to the
federal claim is the constitutional notion of a "matter," which, like the
expressions "cases" and "controversies" in the United States Constitution,
encompasses the whole matter or controversy between the parties. 7 In a
series of key cases,' the High Court embraced a broad notion of accrued
jurisdiction in relation to the Federal Court, albeit over vigorous dissent.
Several propositions may be distilled from the central cases as to the
nature and operation of accrued jurisdiction in Australia. First, a federal court
has jurisdiction to adjudicate an entire "matter," including federal and nonfederal claims, provided the latter claims are attached to and not severable
from the former. 9 Second, whether a non-federal claim is severable and
distinct from a federal claim is largely "a matter of impression and of practical
judgment,""o to be determined by reference to what the parties have done,
their pleadings, and the conduct of the proceedings. One useful guide,
resembling the test adopted by the United States Supreme Court in United
Mine Workers v. Gibbs,'9' is whether the federal and non-federal claims
arise out of "common transactions and facts.""' 2 Third, the exercise of
accrued jurisdiction is discretionary, although "there would need to be very
good reasons why a court which could resolve the whole matter should refuse
or fail to do so."" 9 Fourth, the federal claim must be a "substantial aspect"
of the controversy,' 94 and it must be bona fide, and not merely a colorable
attempt to attract the jurisdiction of a federal court over a non-federal
claim. 9 Fifth, once a federal court is properly seized of a "matter," it has

186. See Carter v. Egg & Egg Pulp Mktg. Board, 66 C.LR. 557 (1942); The King v. Bevan
66 C.L.R. 452 (1942).
187. See generally Lee Aitken, The Meaning of "Matter": A Matter of Meaning-Some
Problems of Accrued Jurisdiction, 14 MONASH U.L. REv. 158 (1988).
188. Philip Morris, 148 C.L.R. 457; Fencott v. Muller, 152 C.L.R. 570 (1983); Stack v.
Coast Securities (No. 9) Pty. Ltd., 154 C.L.R. 261 (1983).
189. Fencott, 152 C.L.R. at 606.
190. Id. at 608.
191. 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966) (holding that the state and federal claims must derive from a
common nucleus of operative fact).
192. Fencott, 152 C.L.R. at 607.
193. PhilipMorris, 148 C.L.R. at 475; see also Stack, 154 C.L.R. at 294-95; cf. UnitedMine
Workers, 383 U.S. at 726; Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 545-46 (1974); Carnegie-Mellon
Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343 (1988).
194. Fencott, 152 C.L.R. at 609-10.
195. PhilipMorris, 148 C.L.R. at 499. For a review of earlier High Court authority on this
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jurisdiction to determine the non-federal claim even if the federal claim is
rejected. Similarly, the court may determine the non-federal claim notwithstanding that the court finds it unnecessary to decide the federal question
because the case can be disposed of on other grounds.1 6 And sixth, the
doctrine of accrued jurisdiction applies not only to claims made between
plaintiff and defendant, but to claims against third parties. This "pendent
party" jurisdiction permits a federal court to adjudicate a non-federal claim
against a person who is not a party to the principal federal claim."
The dependence of the doctrine of accrued jurisdiction on the constitutional conception of a "matter" suggests that the doctrine ought to be available
equally in all federal courts. Yet accrued jurisdiction has fared less well in the
Family Court than in the Federal Court. It might have been thought, for
example, that the doctrine could have gone some way toward overcoming the
jurisdictional difficulties of the Family Court in relation to the custody of exnuptial children and the interests of third parties, but this has not generally
been the case. 198 The leading High Court decision, Smith v. Smith, 99
concerned the jurisdiction of the Family Court to approve a maintenance
agreement between parties to a dissolved marriage. A difficulty arose because
the agreement purported to exclude future claims under the Family Provision
Act 1982 (N.S.W.), which enabled provision to be made out of a deceased
person's estate for the maintenance, education, or advancement of a family
member. The legislation specifically permitted the Supreme Court of New
South Wales to approve a person's release of his or her right to make an
application under the Act in relation to a deceased person, and the question
arose whether the Family Court could approve the release in the course of
approving the maintenance agreement. The High Court held that the Family
Court had no accrued jurisdiction to exercise the power of approval conferred
on the Supreme Court under the state family provision legislation because that
matter was a distinct and severable claim from the approval of the maintenance

point, see Aitken, supra note 187.
196. Moorgate Tobacco Co. v. Philip Morris Ltd., 145 C.L.R. 457, 476 (1980); Philip
Morris, 148 C.L.R. at 474; cf. Siler v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 213 U.S. 175, 191
(1909).
197. Stohl Aviation v. Electrum Finance Pty. Ltd., 56 A.L.R. 716 (1984); Obacelo Pty. Ltd.
v. TaveraftPty. Ltd., 5 F.C.R. 210 (1985); cf. Aldingerv. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 15, 18 (1976).
198. See Michael R. Errington, The Implicationsof Smith v. Smith, 1 AUSTL. J. FAM. L. 255
(1986); L.J.W. Aitken, The Accrued and AssociatedJurisdictionof the Family Court, 3 AUSTL.
J. FAM. L. 101 (1989); CRAWFORD, supra note 28, at 226-27. In one early case, a Family Court
judge held that the Court had accrued jurisdiction to make orders with respect to the custody of
a child of a marriage and two ex-nuptial children, but however desirable that outcome, it is
doubtful whether the decision can be regarded as correct in the light of subsequent High Court
authority. See Lye and Lye F.L.C. § 91-324 (1983).
199. 161 C.L.R. 217 (1986).
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agreement itself and required consideration of different factors. 2' Moreover, if the Family Court had assumed an accrued jurisdiction to approve the
release, it would not have been effective for the purposes of the Family
Provision Act 1982 because that Act specifically required approval by order
of the state's Supreme Court.2"' Certain statements in the judgments suggest
an approach to accrued jurisdiction in family law matters that is rather more
restrictive than that applied to the Federal Court, leading one commentator to
remark that their disparate treatment probably rested more on the perceived
quality of the judges than on any difference of constitutional principle. 0 2
Notwithstanding the limitations on the doctrine of accrued jurisdiction in
the context of family law, the evolution of associated and accrued jurisdiction
has had an important bearing on the role and status of state and federal courts.
Justice Mason acknowledged this in Philip Morris when describing an
apprehension that, if the Federal Court were to have jurisdiction over attached
non-federal claims, "State courts will lose to the Federal Court a proportion
of the important work which they have hitherto discharged .... "203 State
courts cannot, of course, accrete to themselves federal claims not otherwise
within their jurisdiction. But the ability of federal courts to exercise
jurisdiction over certain federal and non-federal claims not otherwise within
their jurisdiction undoubtedly expands the range of matters capable of being
brought in federal courts. This is especially noticeable when a non-federal
claim is closely allied to a federal claim within the exclusive jurisdiction of a
federal court, as was the case before 1987 with passing off actions and claims
arising under section 52 of the Trade Practices Act.2' The Federal Court's
ability to deal with both claims by means of its accrued and vested jurisdiction
effectively deprived the state courts of much of their common law jurisdiction
over passing off claims.
Despite the benefits of associated and accrued jurisdiction in avoiding
multiplicity of proceedings, the doctrines have been more an anodyne than a
panacea for the jurisdictional ills of the federal courts. Even when the
doctrines were at their zenith, split jurisdictional problems persisted in cases
in which federal and non-federal claims arose in the course of one dispute, but
were nonetheless regarded as severable. To take an illustration, in one case
the purchasers of a caravan park commenced an action in the Federal Court
against the vendors alleging misrepresentations in relation to the value of the
business and contraventions of Part V of the Trade Practices Act 1974.205

200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.

Id. at 250-51.
Id.
Aitken, supra note 187, at 113.
148 C.L.R. at 513.
See supra part III.C.
Obacelo Pty. Ltd. v. Taveraft Pty. Ltd., 5 F.C.R. 210 (1985).
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The vendors brought a third-party claim against their own solicitors for
negligence and breach of contract on the ground that the solicitors failed to
exercise due care in the sale. However, the Federal Court declined to exercise
accrued jurisdiction over the third-party claim. Notwithstanding that the
principal claim and the third-party claim involved some mutually relevant
evidence and that it was desirable for the vendors to have all matters disposed
of simultaneously, the two claims were held to be distinct and severable, and
did not relevantly arise out of common transactions and facts.2" 6 Accordingly, the principal claim had to be determined in the Federal Court and the other
claim in a state court.
The persistence of such problems resulted in continuing pressure for
jurisdictional reform in the federal judicial system. Indeed, many of the later
reforms, such as the reference of state powers to the Commonwealth and the
cross-vesting of jurisdiction of superior courts, have eclipsed the doctrines of
associated and accrued jurisdiction in terms of practical importance. The
cross-vesting scheme, for example, makes it largely unnecessary for superior
courts to determine whether state or federal jurisdiction is being exercised in
any particular case. Nonetheless, associated and accrued jurisdiction still play
some part in understanding the jurisdictional landscape of Australian courts,
both as a matter of history and as a matter of current practice. Accrued
jurisdiction continues to have relevance for the High Court and the Industrial
Relations Court, which are not part of the cross-vesting scheme, and
associated jurisdiction continues to have relevance for the Federal Court and
the Family Court, whose jurisdiction is not cross-vested in each other under
the cross-vesting legislation. 2°7
B. Reference of Legislative Powers
Section 51(xxxvii) of the Australian Constitution empowers the federal
legislature to make laws with respect to "Matters referred to the Parliament of
the Commonwealth by the Parliament or Parliaments of any State or States,
but so that the law shall extend only to States by whose Parliaments the matter
is referred, or which afterwards adopt the law." The purpose of this provision
was evidently to provide a means by which states might, by common
agreement, bring about federal action without the need to amend the
Constitution. It is thus one of several means by which state and federal

206. Id. at 217-18. For further examples in the context of trade practices, see Pallas v. Finlay,
61 A.L.R. 220, 222 (1985); Maisey v. First Coast Pty. Ltd., 1 F.C.R. 316, 320 (1984);
Friendship Corp. Pry. Ltd. v. Adamad Pty. Ltd., 6 F.C.R. 351, 354 (1984). Similar problems
have arisen in other contexts. See O'Neil v. Wratten, 11 F.C.R. 404, 413 (1986) (administrative
law); In the Marriageof McKay, 59 A.L.R. 117 (1984) (family law).
207. See infra part IV.C.
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governments may cooperate to solve problems arising from limitations on
federal legislative power."°
Although the section has been subject to little judicial exegesis and
academic commentary, 20 9 several aspects of its operation are clear. First,
a matter can be referred to the Commonwealth by a state in general terms. It
had at one time been suggested that section 51(xxxvii) only enabled federal
Parliament to enact a law the terms of which had been completely determined
by the referring state. However, the High Court has rejected as absurd the
proposition that the only matters that can be referred are those requiring the
conversion of state Bills into federal laws.210 Accordingly, where a matter
has been referred in general terms, the Commonwealth has discretion as to the
precise content of the legislation that it enacts in reliance on the reference.
Secondly, legislative power over the referred matter does not become
exclusive to the federal Parliament by virtue of the reference.
Like most
federal legislative powers granted by section 51 of the Constitution, legislative
power over the referred matter may be exercised concurrently by the
states, 212 except to the extent that state law is inconsistent with federal law,
in which case federal law prevails.2 3 Thirdly, a state need not refer a
matter once and for all time.2 4 A reference may be conditional, for
example, on a similar reference being made by other states or it may be
terminable on the happening of a particular event.
Given the apparent flexibility of section 51(xxxvii) and the notorious
difficulty of securing constitutional change in Australia by means of referendum,215 the section might have been thought of as an attractive mechanism
208. See also § 51(xxxviii) (empowering the federal Parliament to make certain laws at the
request or with the concurrence of the state Parliaments directly concerned) AUSTL. CONST., ch.

I, pt. V, § 51(xxxviii).
209. See generally, Ross Anderson, Reference of Powers by the States to the Commonwealth,
2 U.W. AuSTL. L. REV. 1 (1951-53); Graeme A.R. Johnson, The Reference Power in the
Australian Constitution,9 MELB. U. L. REV. 42 (1973); J.T. Ludeke, The Reference ofIndustrial
Powers from the States to the Commonwealth, 22 J. INDUS. REL. 231 (1980); Greg Craven,
Death of a Placitum:The Fall and Fall of the Reference Power, 1 PUB. L. REv. 285 (1990).
210. The Queen v. Public Vehicles Licensing Appeal Tribunal, Ex parte Australian Nat'l
Airways Pty. Ltd., 113 C.L.R. 207, 225 (1964).
211. Graham v. Paterson, 81 C.L.R. 1 (1950).
212. However, some legislativepowers enumerated in § 51 are by their very nature exclusive
to the Commonwealth, such as the power over external affairs. See New South Wales v.
Commonwealth, 135 C.L.R. 337, 373 (1975); H. Burmester, The Australian States and
Participationin the ForeignPolicy Process, 9 FaD. L. REv. 257, 275-80 (1978).
213. AuSTL. CONST ch. V, § 109.
214. Public Vehicles Licensing Appeal Tribunal, 113 C.L.R. at 226.
215. AUSTL. CONST. Ch. VIII, § 128. permits amendment of the Constitution by referendum,
but requires the proposed change to be approved by a majority of voters overall and by a majority
of voters in a majority of states. Of more than 40 referendum proposals only eight have been
carried, the last in 1977.
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for securing desired change. In fact, until the comparatively recent reference
of power over child custody, little effective use was made of the section. It
has been documented, for example, that in the first 70 years of federation,
only 23 state Acts were passed referring matters to the Commonwealth, eleven
of which related to wartime powers, and that only four federal Acts were
passed in reliance on state references. 2 6 There are several reasons for this
modest record. States have been understandably reluctant to cede additional
powers to the Commonwealth in light of the history of steady federal
encroachment into areas of traditional state concern. There are continuing
constitutional uncertainties about the scope of the reference power and, in
particular, about the ability of a state to revoke a reference and the effect on
existing laws of such a revocation. Often it has been difficult to secure the
simultaneous agreement of the states in circumstances in which a uniform
approach has been desirable.21 7 In the words
of one commentator, "it is
21 8
hard to make six clocks strike all at once."
Notwithstanding the historical reluctance of states to use section
51(xxxvii), during the 1980s the section was employed for the important
purpose of referring to the Commonwealth certain matters relating to child
custody. A principal objective of the reference, which had its genesis in
recommendations dating back to the 1970s,2" 9 was to avoid the jurisdictional
difficulties that the Family Court had faced in dealing with the custody of exnuptial children. The High Court had held on several occasions that the
federal legislative power over "marriage" extended to making laws with
respect to the custody of children of a marriage, but not to the custody of exnuptial children.' 0 This limitation on legislative power was mirrored in the
jurisdiction of the Family Court, and this created particular difficulties for
families that had some children of each kind: the custody and guardianship of
different children had to be settled in different courts.
To solve these difficulties, between 1986 and 1990 five states referred to
the Commonwealth the matters of (a) child maintenance and (b) the custody
and guardianship of, and access to, children.221 The sixth state, Western
216. Johnson, supra note 209, at 45.
217. For example, in the 1920s, a proposal to secure uniform laws for air navigation
throughout Australia by means of the reference power failed by reason of lack of agreement
amongst the states. Two states referred the matter to the Commonwealth as agreed, two others
made a reference over air navigation in much more limited terms, and the remaining states did
not refer the matter at all. As the result, the federal Air Navigation Act 1920 was never
proclaimed. See id. at 48-50.
218. K.H. Bailey, Fifty Years of the Australian Constitution, 25 AUSTL. L. J. 314, 335 (1951)
(paraphrasing John Adam's aphorism).
219. PROCEEDINGS OF THE AUSTRALIAN CONST. CONVENTION, 48-68 (1976); JOINT SELECT
COMMITrEE ON THE FAMILY LAW ACT, supra note 148, at § 2.28-2.31.
220. See supra part III.B.
221. Commonwealth Powers (Family Law - Children) Act 1986 (N.S.W.); Commonwealth
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Australia, gave no reference because the establishment of a state family court
in that state circumvented the jurisdictional difficulties experienced elsewhere
in Australia. The references made by the remaining states expressly exempted
from their scope matters of child adoption and the custody and guardianship
of children who are wards of the state. Moreover, conformably with High
Court authority,222 the references were expressed to be terminable upon
proclamation by the Governor of the state.
It goes without saying that the state references alone effected no change
in the jurisdictional relationship of state and federal courts with respect to child
custody. These changes were only brought about by Commonwealth
legislation based on the newly acquired power. In 1987 the Commonwealth
passed such a law, inserting a substantially new Part VII into the Family Law
Act 1975. 2
The practical significance of the reference was that the
Commonwealth was no longer required to enact child custody laws that bore
a nexus to the marriage relationship, as it was previously required to do when
it relied on the "marriage" power. Accordingly, Part VII now refers to the
custody and guardianship of, and access to, children in general, and not
merely children of a marriage. Moreover, third party custody proceedings
have been considerably relaxed and may now be instituted by any person who
has an interest in the welfare of the child,224 whether or not a party to the
marriage is a party to the proceedings. Jurisdiction with respect to these and
2
other matters arising under Part VII is conferred on the Family Court, 25
with the result that that Court is now able to determine a whole matter before
it in relation to child custody, guardianship, access, and maintenance, without
the need to distinguish between nuptial and ex-nuptial children.
The successful eradication of split jurisdictional problems in relation to
child custody suggests that section 5 1(xxxvii) of the Constitution might be used
to solve other jurisdictional difficulties that arise in the Australian federal
system. Another aspect of family law jurisdiction that has generated some
difficulty is that of de facto relationships. The Commonwealth has power to
legislate with respect to marriage, but it is unlikely that this power extends to
making laws with respect to individuals who live only in a marriage-like
relationship. Accordingly, parties to a de facto relationship do not have the
benefit of federal laws with respect to the alteration of property interests and

Powers (Family Law - Children) Act 1986 (Vic.); Commonwealth Powers (Family Law) Act
1986 (S. Austl.); Commonwealth Powers (Family Law) Act 1987 (Tas.); Commonwealth Powers
(Family Law - Children) Act 1990 (Queensl.).
222. See supra note 208.
223. Family Law Amendment Act 1987. By § 60E(4), part VII is expressed to extend to a
state only while there is in force state legislation referring to the Commonwealth some or all of
the matters dealt with by that Part.
224. Family Law Act 1975 § 63C.
225. Id. § 63.
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the provision of maintenance. In an attempt to remedy this situation, the
Standing Committee of Attorneys-General at one stage proposed uniform state
and federal legislation on de facto relationships to replace the varying state
laws on the subject.1 6 However, the option now being pursued is a reference of power from the states to the Commonwealth in relation to maintenance, and alteration of property interests, of de facto partners. Not all states
are in favor of a reference of power, but the Queensland Law Reform
Commission has recommended this course, 7 and the Queensland cabinet
has approved a reference of power in principle."
When the reference is
complete, the Commonwealth will be able to give people in de facto
relationships the same access as married people to the laws and procedures
available under the Family Law Act 1975, at least in those states willing to
refer the matter.
C. Cross-vesting of Jurisdiction
The final jurisdictional development to be considered in this paper is the
scheme for cross-vesting the jurisdiction of superior courts in Australia, which
came into effect on July 1, 1988.229 As we have seen, the growth of federal
jurisdiction and federal courts in the 1970s and 1980s gave rise to numerous
practical and legal problems. Foremost amongst these were the split
jurisdictional problems that arose from the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal
Court and the Family Court and the longer-term concerns about the declining
status of state courts. Numerous reform proposals emerged from these
circumstances, including recommendations for a unified court system for

226. On the existing state laws, see DICKEY, supra note 142, at 194-205.
227. QUEENSLAND LAW REFORM COMMISSION, DE FACTO RELATIONSHIPS, Report No. 44,
at 3-5 (1993); see also QUEENSLAND LAW REFORM COMMISSION, SHARED PROPERTY, Discussion
Paper No. 36, at 5-15 (1991); QUEENSLAND LAW REFORM COMMISSION, DE FACTO
RELATIONSHIPS, Working Paper No. 40, at 20-25 (1992).
228. De Facto Changes Applauded, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, Aug. 30, 1994.
229. There is a considerable literature on the scheme. See generally, Clifton Baker, Crossvesting of Jurisdictionbetween State and Federal Courts, 14 U. QUEENSL. L. J. 118 (1987);
Keith Mason & James Crawford, The Cross-vesting Scheme, 62 AUSTL. L. J. 328 (1988); David
St. L. Kelly & James Crawford, Choiceof Law Under the Cross-vestingLegislation, 62 AUSTL.
L. J. 589 (1988); Gavan Griffith et al., Choice of Law in Cross-vestedJurisdiction:A Reply to
Kelly and Crawford, 62 AUSL. L. J. 698 (1988); Gavan Griffith et al., FurtherAspects of the
Cross-vestingScheme, 62 AUSTL. L. J. 1016 (1988); Dorothy Kovacs, Cross-VestingofJurisdiction: New Solutions or New Problems?, 16 MELB. U.L. REV. 669 (1988); Stephen O'Ryan,
Cross-vesting: An Early Report, 3 AUSTL. J. FAM. L. 1 (1989); BERNARD C. CAIRNS,
AUSTRALIAN CIVIL PROCEDURE 577-97 (3d ed. 1992); GARRIE J. MOLONEY & SUSAN
MCMASTER, CROSS-VESTING OF JURISDICTION: A REVIEW OF THE OPERATION OF THE NATIONAL

SCHEME (1992); Herbert A. Johnson, Historicaland ConstitutionalPerspectiveson Cross-vesting
of Court Jurisdiction, 19 MELB. U.L. REV. 45 (1993); Garrie J. Moloney, Cross-vesting of
Jurisdiction:Nationalism Versus Robust Individualism. 3 J. JUD. ADMIN. 229 (1994).
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Australia. However, the proposal that was eventually pursued by the Standing
Committee of Attorneys-General and adopted by state and federal Parliaments
was for cross-vesting the jurisdiction of Australian superior courts. In 1987
the Commonwealth Parliament and each of the Parliaments of the states and
the Northern Territory enacted legislation in agreed terms under the name of
the Jurisdiction of Courts (Cross-vesting) Act 1987.'o
The cross-vesting scheme is simple in concept, but effects a radical
change in the Australian judicial system. The scheme comprises two main
aspects which operate independently but are nonetheless related. First, the
scheme cross-vests the subject-matter jurisdiction of participating courts, and,
secondly, the scheme provides for the transfer of proceedings between those
courts. The courts participating in the scheme are two federal courts (the
Federal Court and the Family Court), the Supreme Court of each of the six
states, and the Supreme Courts of the two Territories (the Northern Territory
and the Australian Capital Territory). Importantly, the scheme excludes from
its ambit the High Court, the Industrial Relations Court and, for the most part
the various lower courts of the participating states,"' and applies only to
civil proceedings. 2 The two aspects of the scheme will be considered in
turn.

With respect to the cross-vesting of jurisdiction, the pivotal provisions of
the scheme are those vesting the subject-matter jurisdiction of participating
courts in various other participating courts, subject to certain exceptions.u3
To take the central example, the Commonwealth Act vests the jurisdiction of
the Federal Court and the Family Court in each of the state Supreme
Courts, 4 and, reciprocally, the State Acts confer original and appellate
jurisdiction in "state matters" on the-Federal Court and the Family Court. 5
Likewise, the jurisdiction of each state Supreme Court is dross-vested in the

230. In this section, the federal legislation forming part of the cross-vesting scheme is referred
to as the "Commonwealth Act," and the state legislation forming part of the scheme is referred
to as the "State Acts."
231. In certain circumstances, a proceeding pending in a lower state court may be removed into
the Supreme Court of that state to be dealt with under the cross-vesting scheme. See
Commonwealth Act § 8; State Acts § 8.
232. Commonwealth Act § 3(1) definition of "proceeding"; and State Acts § 3(5).
233. The principal exceptions relate to federal industrial law and certain trade practices. See
Commonwealth Act § 4(4). In these matters the manifest object of the Act was not to disturb the
exclusive jurisdiction of federal courts. See N.E.C. Information Sys. Australia Pty. Ltd. v.
Lockhart, 108 A.L.R. 561, 567 (1992).
234. Commonwealth Act § 4(1).
235. See State Acts §§ 4(1) & 4(2). "State matter" is defined in § 3(1) to mean a matter in
which the Supreme Court has jurisdiction otherwise than by reason of a Commonwealth law.
Thus, if a Supreme Court is invested with federal jurisdiction in a particular matter, that
jurisdiction is not cross-vested in a federal court.
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other Supreme Courts,236 although the jurisdiction of the Federal Court and
the Family Court is not cross-vested as between themselves. 237 By crossvesting the jurisdiction of state and federal courts in this manner, the various
Australian governments hoped to bring about a situation in which "no action
will fail in a court through lack of jurisdiction, and ...
no court will have to
determine the boundaries between Federal, State and Territory jurisdic-

tions. "'
It may immediately be asked whether such scheme is constitutionally
permissible. There is clearly no difficulty in investing state courts with federal
jurisdiction,2 39 but whether a federal court can exercise state jurisdiction is
a more difficult question. The legislative scheme proceeds on the basis that
federal courts can exercise judicial power from sources other than Chapter III
of the Constitution, such as that conferred on them by a state. However, there
is a respectable view to the contrary; the comprehensive language of sections
75 and 76 of the Constitution may be taken to specify exhaustively the scope
of the original jurisdiction of federal courts. This view has been asserted on
several occasions,240 but for present purposes it may be assumed that the
scheme is valid.
The second aspect of the scheme relates to the transfer of proceedings
between participating courts. As a result of the cross-vesting of jurisdiction,
it is possible for a litigant to commence most proceedings in any of the
participating courts without regard to the subject-matter of the action.
However, it was always intended that federal and state courts stay within their
traditional jurisdictional fields. To this end, the legislation provides for the
transfer of proceedings between participating courts. 24'
The transfer
provisions operate independently of the provisions with respect to the cross-

236. State Acts § 4(3).
237. There was no need to cross-vest the jurisdiction of the federal courts because the doctrine
of associated jurisdiction ensured that split jurisdictional problems did not arise between these
courts. See suprapart IV.A.
238. C. OF AuSTL., P. DEBATES, H. OF R. 2556 (Oct. 22, 1986).
239. AuSTL. CONST. ch. III, § 77(iii).
240. CONST. COMM'N, AUSTL. JUD. Sys. ADVISORY COMM., supra note 84, § 3.114; Mason
& Crawford supra note 229, at 333-34; Bernard O'Brien, The Constitutional Validity of the
Cross-VestingLegislation,17 MELB. U.L. REV. 307 (1989); Grace Bros Pty. Ltd. v. Magistrates
of the Local Courts of New South Wales, A.T.P.R. 40-921 (1989); West Australian Psychiatric
Nurses' Ass'n (Union of Workers) v. Australian Nursing Fed'n, 102 A.L.R. 265,274-80 (1991);
contra, Re T [1990] 1 Qd. R. 196.
241. Commonwealth Act § 5, State Acts § 5. The legislation also contemplates a transfer to
non-participating courts in certain trade practices matters. See Commonwealth Act § 10, State
Acts § 10. These sections, together with the analogous provision in § 86A Trade Practices Act
1974, have been frequently utilized by the courts, as evidenced by the fact that nearly half the
transfers in trade practices matters have been made to lower courts. See MOLONEY &
MCMASTER, supra note 229, app. 1, tbl. E.
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vesting of jurisdiction with the result that a matter may be transferred between
participating courts irrespective of whether cross-vested jurisdiction is being
exercised. In addition to this general scheme, there are also several other
schemes for the transfer of proceedings between courts in particular classes of
matters. Such schemes exist in relation to corporations law, family law,
admiralty proceedings, and trade practices, but the details of these ancillary
schemes need not concern us here. 42
So far as the general transfer scheme is concerned, section 5 of the
Commonwealth Act and the State Acts place an obligation on a court to
transfer a pending matter to another participating court, where it would be
more appropriate for the other court to hear the matter, having regard to a
number of factors. The factors to be considered include the existence of
related proceedings in another court; whether the court would have had
jurisdiction in the absence of the cross-vesting scheme; whether the interpretation of a Commonwealth law is in issue; and the interests of justice. To
facilitate the transfer process, a court can transfer a proceeding of its own
motion, and a decision in relation to transfer is not subject to appeal.243
One important exception to the transfer provisions arises in relation to a
"special federal matter," which is defined to include, inter alia, restrictive
trade practices matters and matters arising from judicial review of federal
administrative action.244 Where a special federal matter is pending in a state
Supreme Court, the Court must transfer the matter to the Federal Court or
other specified court, unless the Supreme Court makes an order to retain the
matter.245 In making a retention order, the Supreme Court must be satisfied
that there are special reasons for doing so unrelated to the convenience of the
parties, and the Court must have regard to the general rule that special federal
matters should be heard by the Federal Court.246 These provisions were
introduced to recognize the special role of the Federal Court in matters in
which it had exclusive original jurisdiction prior to the commencement of the
cross-vesting scheme, and they have been described as fundamental to the
operation of the cross-vesting scheme. 47 The practical effect of the provi242. For a discussion of these schemes, see MOLONEY & MCMASTER, supra note 229, at 5167.
243. Commonwealth Act §§ 5(7) & 13(a); State Acts §§ 5(7) & 13(a).
244. Commonwealth Act § 3(1); State Acts § 3(1).
245. Commonwealth Act § 6; State Acts § 6.
246. Commonwealth Act §§ 6(3) and 6(6). Additionally, the Court must give notice of the
pending special federal matter to the Commonwealth Attorney-General, whose submissions must
be taken into account in deciding whether or not the matter ought to be retained.
247. N.E.C. Info. Sys. Austl. Pty. Ltd. v. Lockhart, 108 A.L.R. 561,570 (1992). Similarly,
Chief Judge Rogers (Com. Div.) has stated that the underlying reasons for the enactment of § 6
were, firstly, the special expertise of the Federal Court with respect to such matters and,
secondly, the desirability that matters of particular concern to the Commonwealth should be
decided by the Federal Court. See Metroplaza Pty. Ltd. v. Girvan NSW Pty. Ltd. (in liq.), 24
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sions with respect to special federal matters is that, notwithstanding that state
Supreme Courts generally have cross-vested jurisdiction in relation to them,
it is rare for a Supreme Court to determine such a matter.248
To a very large extent, the transfer provisions are the linchpin of the
cross-vesting scheme, for unless proceedings are transferred in such a way that
each participating court keeps within its "proper" jurisdictional fields, there
is potential for a dramatic redistribution of jurisdiction between state and
federal courts in Australia. The Attorney-General, Mr. Lionel Bowen,
recognized this fact when introducing the cross-vesting legislation into
Parliament:
The successful operation of the cross-vesting scheme will depend very
much upon courts approaching the legislation in accordance with its
general purpose and intention as indicated in the preamble to the Commonwealth and State legislation. Courts will need to be ruthless in the exercise
of their transferral powers to ensure that litigants do not engage in 'forum
shopping' by commencing proceedings in inappropriate courts or resort to
other tactical manoeuvres that would otherwise be available to them by
reason of the fact that State courts would have all the jurisdiction of the
Federal Courts and vice versa. The courts themselves would also be
expected not to take advantage of the legislation to aggregate business to
their own courts in matters that would not otherwise have been within their
respective jurisdiction.2 49
Having regard to the innovative, but complex, nature of the cross-vesting
scheme, judges of the participating courts and others have attempted to keep
its operation under close observation. Reviewing the scheme in 1992, four
years after it came into effect, Moloney and McMaster concluded that the
scheme has worked effectively and efficiently over the course of its short life,
although it is not without problems.5 ( They went on to state that the
scheme "has gone a considerable way to overcoming many of the jurisdictional
problems which previously beset litigants in Australian courts. To this extent,
it has met its fundamental aims, albeit that it has created a new set of
constructional issues along the way.""'

N.S.W. L.R. 718, 722 (1991).
248. In a review of the operation of the cross-vesting scheme in 1992, there were found to be
only six reported cases pertaining to the transfer of special federal matters. See MOLONEY &
MCMASTER, supra note 229, at 104 n.201.
249. C. OF AUSTL., P. DEBATES, H. OF R., 2557 (Oct. 22, 1986).
250. MOLONEY & MCMASTER, supra note 229, at 147.

251. Id.
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CONCLUSION

Many Australian commentators have disparaged the very existence of
federal jurisdiction and aspersed the "hypnotic fascination" of Australia's
constitutional drafters with the judicature provisions of the United States
Constitution. 2 Sir Owen Dixon once described the subtleties and refinements of the law of federal jurisdiction as forming "a special and peculiarly
arid study,"" while Cowen and Zines have described the field as "technical, complicated, difficult and not infrequently absurd. " 4 Yet the law of
federal jurisdiction involves fundamental questions of judicial power and offers
insights into the allocation of authority within the system of federal government in Australia. This paper has addressed one aspect of the allocation of
judicial authority by examining the way in which the federal legislature has
distributed federal jurisdiction between state and federal courts within the
Australian federation.
In 1901 it was predicted that the judicial power of the Commonwealth
would, for the foreseeable future, be exercised entirely by the High Court and
by state courts invested with federal jurisdiction. 1 5 The latter measure-the
so-called autochthonous expedient-may have been antithetical to pure
principles of federalism, but it was readily seized on as a convenient means of
dealing with the new class of matters marked out by Chapter III of the
Constitution. The historical reliance on the investiture of state courts with
federal jurisdiction no doubt maintained and enhanced the role and status of
those courts, whose daily business involved the interpretation of federal laws
enacted pursuant to the Constitution.
The authority of state courts in exercising the judicial power of the
Commonwealth was basically left unchallenged until the 1970s. The
increasing volume of federal legislation around this period, covering all aspects
of commercial and private life, brought about a corresponding rise in the range
of matters falling within federal jurisdiction and with it questions about the
appropriate allocation of the new jurisdiction within the federation. Although
specialized federal courts had earlier been created in relation to bankruptcy
and labor law, the establishment of the Family Court in 1975 and the Federal
Court in 1976 posed a new and direct challenge to the traditional position of
state courts, insofar as they were invested with federal jurisdiction.
In exercise of the powers granted to it by the Constitution, the federal
Parliament soon conferred jurisdiction on the new federal courts in a range of
federal matters. In some matters the courts were empowered to exercise

252.
253.
254.
255.

Cowen & Zines, supra note 2, at xv; Dixon, supra note 79, at 597.
Dixon, supra note 79, at 608.
Cowen & Zines, supra note 2, at xiv.
See supra note 16.
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original jurisdiction, but in others they only exercised appellate jurisdiction,
the matters having been heard at first instance in state courts. Likewise, the
original jurisdiction of the new federal courts was sometimes made exclusive
of, and sometimes concurrent with, that of the states.
Various principles and policies have underpinned the legislative choices
relating to the conferral of jurisdiction on state and federal courts, but these
policies have not always been clearly articulated or thoroughly explored.
Foremost amongst these underlying policies has been the desire for uniformity,
specialization and efficacy in the interpretation and enforcement of federal law.
In general, these factors have pointed towards the conferral of federal
jurisdiction on federal courts rather than state courts, but the preference for
conferring jurisdiction on federal courts has not been without cost. There have
been costs for individual litigants in terms of access to justice and split
jurisdictional problems. And there have been costs for the judicial system as
a whole in terms of heightened tensions between the state and federal spheres
of the judicature. Most noticeable is the concern that the function and status
of state courts will decline as the jurisdiction of the federal courts continues
to expand.
Three recent developments in the jurisdiction of Australian courts have
had an impact on the respective roles of state and federal courts in the federal
system of government. The emergence of the doctrine of accrued jurisdiction,
the reference of state power to the Commonwealth in respect of child custody,
and the establishment of the cross-vesting scheme have all ameliorated the split
jurisdictional problems faced by litigants. However, they have done little to
arrest the declining role and status of state courts. The cross-vesting scheme
has probably been neutral in its impact on the balance of jurisdiction between
state and federal courts because, although the jurisdiction of all participating
courts has been enlarged, the transfer provisions have ensured that each court
stays within its traditional jurisdictional fields. By contrast, the development
of accrued jurisdiction and the reference of power to the Commonwealth have
enhanced the jurisdiction of federal courts at the expense of the jurisdiction of
state courts.
It seems inevitable that the quantity and variety of federal law will
continue to expand as Australia's position in the world becomes increasingly
internationalized 6 and as legislative power within Australia becomes
increasingly centralized. As a result, the range of matters falling within
federal jurisdiction must necessarily expand, and with it, the power of the
Commonwealth to determine an appropriate balance between the jurisdiction
of state and federal courts, in matters of federal jurisdiction. In the past, the

256. On the link between Australia's ratification of international treaties and the growth of
federal law, see Brian R. Opeskin & Donald R. Rothwell, The Impact of Treatieson Australian
Federalism, 27 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 1 (1995).
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Commonwealth has been sensitive to the need to preserve a viable and
respected system of state courts capable of exercising invested federal
jurisdiction. However, it is difficult to resist the conclusion of the Australian
Judicial System Advisory Committee that the more that federal jurisdiction is
conferred on federal courts the more it is likely to seem appropriate to confer
further jurisdiction on those courts. If that is so, fundamental questions about
the appropriate role of state and federal courts in the Australian federal system
are destined to remain.
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